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FOUNDATIONS FOR AN INTERPERSONAL UNCERTAINTY CONSTRUCT 
AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ATTITUDE SIMILARITY, 
UNCERTAINTY AND ATTRACTION 
BY: DEBORAH ANN ROACH
MAJOR PROFESSOR: H. WAYLAND CUMMINGS, PH.D.
The focus of this investigation was on the construction 
and validation of an uncertainty instrument and on its sub­
sequent ability to address the relationships among attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction. In order to construct 
the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, 65 items were generated 
from current conceptualizations of uncertainty in the liter­
ature and were presented to subjects across four levels of 
attitude similarity. Attitude similarity was operationalized 
through the use of a bogus stranger questionnaire. The re­
sults of a principle components analysis revealed the exis­
tence of a single ten-item factor which tapped both the dimen­
sions of perceived ability to predict and explain others' 
behaviors, values, attitudes, beliefs, etc.
The newly developed Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale then 
was employed in an experimental study in an effort to (1) pro­
vide support for the construct validity of the scale and (2) 
assess the potential of uncertainty as a candidate for mediation
xi
in the attitude similarity - attraction relationship. Results 
of the study partially supported the reliability and validity 
of the scale, although problems inherent to the study made 
the findings difficult to interpret. The findings are dis­
cussed in light of four major validity issues and their per­
tinence to this study.
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FOUNDATIONS FOR AN INTERPERSONAL 
UNCERTAINTY CONSTRUCT AND THE 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ATTITUDE 
SIMILARITY, UNCERTAINTY 
AND ATTRACTION
CHAPTER I  
RATIONALE AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the past several years in the disciplines of Psy­
chology and Communication, researchers have focused much 
attention on Berger and Calabrese's (1975) theory of initial 
interactions and on their intuitively appealing arguments 
concerning uncertainty, the theory's central construct. Out 
of the series of "axioms" and "theorems" which Berger and 
Calabrese (1975) articulated, a variety of research has 
emerged which seeks to explicate the relationships among atti­
tude similarity, uncertainty and attraction. Although research 
in this area has provided some useful insights concerning the 
hypothesized relationships, one perplexing problem also has 
emerged. Like much of the research which has addressed the 
attitude similarity-attraction relationship, studies concern­
ing attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction have
been plagued with inconsistent and conflicting results. Con­
sequently, the potential value of the uncertainty construct 
itself has been called into question.
Although the concept of "uncertainty" indeed may pro­
vide ultimately little information concerning the attitude 
similarity-attraction relationship, a critical review of the 
literature provides a compelling argument to the contrary 
and suggests two alternative reasons for the existence of 
conflicting results. First, many researchers who have ad­
dressed the relationships among attitude similarity, uncer­
tainty and attraction have adopted, without question, many 
of the assumptions and the research paradigms of their prede­
cessors. As a result, like many of the earlier studies fo­
cusing on attitude similarity and attraction, research in the 
area of uncertainty has been fraught with untested assumptions, 
with designs and procedures employing predominantly non-face- 
to-face interactions, and with the improper use of statistical 
procedures in those few studies which have attempted to utilize 
face-to-face interactions. In combination, these weaknesses 
have produced often ungeneralizable, unreliable and contra­
dictory results.
Second, no significant comprehensive operationalization 
of the uncertainty construct has been developed to date. 
Consequently, no valid and reliable indexes of uncertainty 
have been established. As a result, scholars understandably 
have produced little valuable information concerning
uncertainty in initial interactions. Of greater importance 
to the thesis of this paper, however, they have produced 
few compelling explanations of the attitude similarity-attrac­
tion relationship.
Given the assumptive stance, the preponderance of meth­
odological and statistical weaknesses, as well as the exis­
tence of no significant operationalization of the uncertainty 
construct, one overall research question emerged for this 
researcher; What relationship, if any, exists among attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction.
In order to address this research question and each of 
the aforementioned areas of concern, the primary objective 
of this investigation was threefold: (1) to review and
critique the literature which focuses on the relationships 
among attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction as well 
as that literature which addresses uncertainty measures spe­
cifically; (2) based on this critique, to construct and vali­
date a measure of interpersonal uncertainty based on the 
cumulative conceptualizations of uncertainty which have emerged 
to date; and (3) given the successful completion of the first 
two aims, to more clearly address the relationships among 
attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction.
The first of these goals will be achieved in the pages 
immediately following and will divide Chapter I of this thesis 
into three major sections. Section One will provide an
historical overview and critique of the attitude similarity- 
attraction literature and will lay a foundation for discus­
sions of the research which has emerged from this early work. 
Section Two will critically review the literature concerning 
attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction, particularly 
those studies which have attempted to build theory in the 
area. Finally, Section Three of this chapter will address 
current conceptualizations of "uncertainty," and will pro­
vide a basis for the realization of this study's remaining 
two research aims. It was hoped that, through a clearer 
understanding of current problems in the literature and the 
use of a more comprehensive measure of uncertainty, a more 
definitive picture of the relationships among attitude sim­
ilarity, uncertainty and attraction would emerge.
Attitude Similarity and Attraction;
A Critical Overview 
Since the dawning of man and his/her first interactions 
with other human creatures, a fascination has prevailed con­
cerning the possible antecedents of interpersonal attraction. 
Indeed, one need look no further than the nearest library 
card catalogue to discover the scores of works which have ad­
dressed the prediction and explanation of this "mysterious" 
phenomenon. Although, as Berger, Weber, Munley and Dixon 
(1977) have noted, many scholars have proffered the existence 
of relationships among such concepts as communicator style
(Norton, 1978), communication apprehension (McCroskey, Daly, 
Richmond, and Cox, 1975), speech style (Giles and Powesland,
1975), reciprocity of self-disclosure (Erlich and Greaven,
1971) and interpersonal attraction, of particular interest 
has been the conjectured relationship between attitude sim­
ilarity and attraction.
Perhaps the most celebrated account of the relationship 
between attitude similarity and attraction has been that of 
Donn Byrne and his associates. Basing their work on a rein­
forcement model of attraction, these researchers argued that 
"attraction toward any individual is a function of the rela­
tive proportions of positive and negative reinforcements"
(Byrne, 1970, p. 108). Conceptualizing attitude similarity 
as one impetus of such reinforcements, Byrne and his col­
leagues produced scores of research findings documenting a 
strong positive relationship between attitude similarity and 
attraction (e.g., Byrne and Nelson, 1965; Byrne, Nelson, and 
Reeves, 1966; Byrne and Griffitt, 1966; Byrne and Clore,
1967; etc.). Byrne's common experimental designs involved 
having a subject complete an attitude questionnaire and, at 
a later date, exposing him or her to a copy of the same atti­
tude questionnaire allegedly completed by another person.
After reading this "bogus stranger's" questionnaire, which 
was marked by the experimenter in such a way as to be similar 
or dissimilar to the subject's responses on the questionnaire, 
the subject then rated the stranger on a measure of interpersonal
attraction, most commonly Byrne's (1971) Interpersonal Judg­
ment Scale (US). As Nicholas and McGinley (1982, p. 93) 
note, "experiments of this design invariably yield[ed] the 
result that Ss are more attracted to strangers who hold at­
titudes similar to their own than to strangers who hold dis­
similar attitudes."
Although such studies as this one and the creation of 
the Interpersonal Judgment Scale provided a critical founda­
tion for research in the area of attraction, research by 
Byrne and his associates harbored two major weaknesses.
First, their research was based on a theoretical model which 
remained untested, specifically a reinforcement model of at­
traction. Second, almost exclusive use of his "bogus stranger" 
techniques, a non-face-to-face procedure, limited Byrne ' s abil­
ity to directly test the attitude similarity-attraction rela­
tionship in "real life" interactions.
Aware of the limitations of the earlier Byrne research, 
Kaplan and Olczak (1970) attempted to examine more defini­
tively the role of direct reinforcement in interpersonal at­
traction. Employing confederates, rather than the bogus 
stranger technique, and differing levels of attitude similar­
ity, Kaplan and Olczak had subjects interact with a confeder­
ate in one of three conditions of direct reinforcement (0%,
50%, or 100% reinforcement) and one of three levels of atti­
tude similarity (0%, 50%, or 100% similarity). Results of 
the study revealed that significant effects on attraction
existed for both variables (F(2,126) = 5.20, 5.25 respectively; 
p < .01), with no interaction effects reaching significance. 
"Combined in a proportion of weighted positive reinforce­
ments model, the two models [i.e., variables] were found to 
be linearly related to attraction (r = .92)" (Kaplan and 
Olczak, 1970, p. 189).
Although Kaplan and Olczak extended the attraction lit­
erature by (1) more directly testing their theoretical frame­
work and (2) utilizing procedures which allowed for greater 
external validity, one major inconsistency emerged from their 
research which calls into question the original interpreta­
tion of their data. When calculated by this researcher for 
the present study, the omega-squares for each independent 
variable-dependent variable combination in Kaplan and
Olczak's research were found to be exceptionally low:
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w = .03, .03, respectively (Note: no measures of this re­
lationship were reported in their published report). This 
discrepancy between the significance of their F-ratios and 
the variance actually accounted for by their independent var­
iables raises questions at three different levels of interpre­
tation. First, the discrepancy calls into question the most 
basic interpretation of their findings : namely, that direct
reinforcement and attitude similarity play both a significant 
and meaningful role in interpersonal attraction. Second, the 
discrepancy acts at an even more general level to question 
the validity of the reinforcement model, the theoretical
8model on which the early attraction literature was based. 
Finally, the calculation of the omega-squares directly calls 
into question the meaningfulness of the linear relationship 
(r = .92) reported by the researchers as a function of "the 
combination of the two variables into a proportion of 
weighted positive reinforcements model" (Kaplan and Olczak, 
1970, p. 189). In short, this inconsistency calls into ques­
tion the validity of the reinforcement model of attraction.
Still other conflicting results also have emerged from 
the literature as scholars attempted to establish, with 
greater validity and reliability, the links among attitude 
similarity, reinforcement and attraction. For example,
Aronson and Worchel (1966) found that, in face-to-face inter­
action rather than in anonymous interaction, positive per­
sonal evaluations by a stranger seem to be more potent in 
producing attraction than attitude similarity —  a result 
which indirectly supported the existence of a relationship 
between reinforcements and attraction, but which called into 
question a direct relationship between attitude similarity 
and attraction. Likewise, Ervin (1981) found that, while 
perceived probability of acceptance (PPA) exhibits a signi­
ficant linear relationship with interpersonal attraction and 
while similarity is significantly correlated with perceived 
probability of acceptance, only PPA has a direct influence 
on interpersonal attraction (p < .001). Contrary to findings 
by Byrne and his colleagues, the correlation between similarity
and interpersonal attraction in Ervin’s study was both weak 
and nonsignificant (r = .34, p > .01).
As a result of contradictory findings such as these, 
alternative approaches to the attitude similarity-attraction 
relationship began to emerge. One such approach was Ander­
son's (1971) information integration approach. This approach 
argued that attraction formation may be considered as an in­
formation integration process, with similarity and dissimilar­
ity treated as information to be integrated into any unitary 
evaluative response —  e.g., attraction (Kaplan, 1972, p. 19). 
Such approaches as Anderson's called into question the rein­
forcement paradigm concerning human interaction, particularly 
as "corners of experience led to data which were less than 
easily fitted into the . . . physical-physiological model of 
man" (Bell, 1979, p. 6). As Bell noted, against a classical 
conditioning backdrop posed by theorists such as Hull . . . 
(and, in this instance, Byrne), "there was little chance of 
recognizing man as irrational, illogical, seeking, organizing, 
structuring, striving and self-regarding" (p. 6).
Based on this realization and the early uncertainty re­
search which emerged in the literature, additional alternative 
conceptions of humans and human interaction began to evolve. 
For example, the work of cognitive psychologists and attri­
bution theorists began to address the concepts of "cognition" 
and "cognitive processes." From emerging theory and research 
in these areas came conceptions of attitude similarity and
10
attraction based on the explication of internal, cognitive 
processes. Of primary importance to the present study was 
research in the area of uncertainty. It is to a review and 
critique of this specific area of research that the discus­
sion now turns.
Attitude Similarity, Uncertainty and 
Attraction; A Critical Review 
As stated in the introduction and as reflected in the 
previous section, studies concerning the relationship between 
attitude similarity and attraction have been plagued with 
contradictory results, primarily due to (1) the use of a 
variety of non-face-to-face research paradigms by researchers, 
without thought to the implications of their sole use for the 
theory building process, and (2) the adoption of an assumptive 
rather than an empirical stance by researchers concerning 
their respective theoretical frameworks. As a result, the 
attraction literature is beset with inconsistent results and 
provides little direction for those interested in the ante­
cedents of attraction. However, much as this indictment holds 
for research reviewed in the previous section, so it has en­
cumbered current research in the area of attitude similarity, 
uncertainty and attraction. As a result, this literature is 
also replete with inconsistencies.
Although this state of affairs indeed is representative 
of both sets of attraction literature, the uncertainty liter­
ature is plagued by two additional problems. First, few
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researchers who have focused on the relationships among atti­
tude similarity, uncertainty and attraction have done so by 
utilizing face-to-face interactions. Of those researchers 
who have, many have improperly utilized statistical proce­
dures when attempting to analyze their data.
Second, no definitive operationalization of the uncer­
tainty construct has been created to date. Consequently, no 
valid and reliable indexes of the concept exist. As a result, 
the potential value of the uncertainty construct has been 
obscured. Additionally, the literature concerning the atti­
tude similarity-attraction relationship has been clouded even 
further.
In order to support these potentially controversial argu­
ments and to substantiate each of the claims, the following 
critical review of the literature is offered. In this second 
major division of Chapter I, the literature concerning atti­
tude similarity, uncertainty and attraction will be reviewed, 
in order to (1) establish the contradictory nature of the 
literature in this area, and (2) provide evidence that prob­
lems one through three may partially account for inconsisten­
cies in the literature. Finally, section three of this paper 
will address previous research which has attempted to tap the 
uncertainty concept. Based on the critique of both litera­
tures and the resulting arguments that are pursued, conclu­
sions will be drawn concerning the value of and possible 
directions for research in the present study.
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Research by Berger and Associates 
Rather than viewing individuals as "objects at the mercy 
of reinforcement contingencies or socially prescribed rules 
and norms" (Berger, 1979, p. 123), Berger and his colleagues 
view man as "an inquirer —  attempting to understand himself/ 
herself and those with whom he or she has relationships"
(p. 123). Out of this perspective and the tradition of at­
tribution theory, Berger's notion of uncertainty emerged with 
the assumption that persons seek to "make sense" out of their 
environments (Heider, 1958; Berger, 1979). As Clatterbuck 
(1979) noted, Berger and his associates make uncertainty re­
duction "a construct based primarily on the flow and inter­
pretation of information" (p. 147). The implication of such 
a formulation is that "individuals can plan their behavior 
more appropriately and effectively when they have information 
which allows the best possible understanding of the situation. 
When information is less than optimal, control will be less 
than optimal, and the individual will face ambiguity or un­
certainty about outcomes" (p. 147) .
In defining, more specifically, the concept of uncer­
tainty, Berger and Calabrese (1975) equated "uncertainty 
reduction" with a person's "increasing predictability about 
the behavior of both [himself or herself] and others in the 
interaction" (p. 100) . However, Berger (1975) further re­
duced this interactive process into two major constructs: 
explanation, or "retroactive attribution," and prediction.
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or "proactive attribution." According to Berger, retroactive 
attribution involves one's ability to interpret the meaning 
of past actions in a relationship and, hence, one's ability 
to gather information upon which future actions will be based. 
Conversely, proactive attribution is defined as the formula­
tion or definition of behavioral options "in the face of the 
wide variety of possible responses available to interacting 
individuals" (Clatterbuck, 1979, p. 147). The reduction of 
uncertainty, for Berger, then involves both (1) the generating 
and confirming of predictions as well as (2) the processes by 
which individuals construct and verify explanations for their 
own and others' behaviors (Berger, 1979, p. 124). In terms 
of attitude similarity and attraction, uncertainty becomes a 
"mediating mechanism" between perceptions of rewards and the 
eventual development of interpersonal attraction" (Berger, 
1979, p. 128).
Perhaps the earliest study conducted by Berger and his 
associates concerning the relationships among attitude sim­
ilarity, uncertainty and attraction was that of Berger and 
Clatterbuck (1976). These researchers investigated "the 
independent and joint effects of attitude similarity and the 
amount of attributional information" on level of uncertainty 
and interpersonal attraction (p. 4). More specifically, they 
hypothesized (1) that perceived attitude similarity was posi­
tively related to interpersonal attraction and inversely re­
lated to uncertainty and (2) that amount of attributional
14
information also was positively related to interpersonal at­
traction and inversely related to uncertainty. Employing 
Byrne's "bogus stranger" technique, Ss were asked to complete 
an initial attitude survey and, one month later, to review a 
questionnaire allegedly completed by a stranger. The latter 
questionnaire varied with regard to level of attitude similar­
ity between Ss and the "bogus" stranger (0, 50, and 100% sim­
ilarity, respectively). Attributional information was manip­
ulated by either the provision or non-provision of explana­
tions by the "bogus stranger" for each of his/her responses 
on the attitude questionnaire. The dependent variables in 
the study were uncertainty level, as indexed by a seven-item 
scale tapping "attributional confidence" (Clatterbuck, 1979) , 
and interpersonal attraction, assessed by Byrne's Interper­
sonal Judgment Scale and McCroskey and McCain's (1974) multi­
dimensional attraction scale.
Results of the study revealed a significant relationship 
between attitude similarity and three of the four measures of 
interpersonal attraction (US: F (2,126) = 31.59, p < .001;
social attractiveness: F (2,126) = 20.47, p < .001; physical
attractiveness: F (2,126) = 4.34, p < .015; and task attrac­
tiveness: F(2,126) = 14.00, p < .001). In addition, an 
overall analysis of variance and pairwise comparisons lent sup­
port for the hypothesized inverse relationship between similar­
ity and level of uncertainty (F(2,126) = 3.92, p = .002).^ 
Because the "attributional information" manipulation did not
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generate the desired effect on a measure of perceived ade­
quacy of information, (i.e., the manipulation check), tests 
of the latter two hypotheses employed the manipulation check 
itself as an independent variable. Results of an analysis of 
variance and use of the Neuman-Keuls procedure revealed a 
significant inverse relationship between attributional in­
formation and uncertainty (F(2,126) = 11.14, p < .001), but 
no significant interactions for attraction between attitude 
similarity and perceived adequacy of information, nor any 
significant main effect differences for the attraction mea­
sures. The results were interpreted as "generally providing 
support for the four hypotheses derived from the Berger- 
Calabrese (1975) uncertainty theory" (Berger and Clatterbuck, 
1976, p. 14) .
Two related studies that emerged from this early re­
search were those of Berger, Munley and Clatterbuck (1976) 
and of Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman and Miller (1976) . 
Extending the earlier research of Berger and Clatterbuck 
(1976) and additional research by Berger and his associates 
concerning background similarity, these two studies focused 
on the relationships among background similarity, uncertainty 
and attraction.
Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman and Miller (1976), for 
example, investigated attractiveness and uncertainty as a 
function of number of compliments, background similarity and 
reciprocity of conversational exchange. In this study, Ss
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were asked to read a transcript of an initial conversation 
between two strangers, with the transcripts varying in levels 
of reciprocity and number of compliments exchanged. The 
background similarity of the two "strangers" was manipulated 
via the insertion of a brief description of each of the par­
ticipants before the transcript of the conversation; these 
descriptions varied in level of background similarity. In 
the no-information, or control, condition no information was 
provided. Results of the study revealed two main effects 
for attraction. Subjects viewed the compliment giver as most 
attractive in the "two compliment condition" and least at­
tractive in the "eight compliment condition" (F (1,145) =
33.92, p < .05). In addition, Ss viewed the conversants as 
more attractive in the reciprocal conditions (F(1,145) =
3.92, p < .05). Third, uncertainty reduction was found to be 
facilitated by the giving of a smaller number of compliments; 
subjects felt more able to predict the behaviors, attitudes, 
and feelings of the conversants, with the most confidence 
displayed regarding the "two compliment" condition: (F(1,128)
= 5.24, p < .025. Finally, female Ss were revealed to have 
more confidence in their predictive ability than males across 
all experimental conditions (F(l,129) = 13.86, p < .05) (p.
168) .2
Related to this study was that of Berger, Munley and 
Clatterbuck (1976), which assessed the relationships among
(1) similarity and uncertainty, (2) similarity and attraction.
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and (3) uncertainty and attraction. In this study, however, 
the researchers were interested in the additive effects of 
background and attitude similarity on uncertainty and attrac­
tion. Hypothesizing that "persons provided with background 
information designed to explain why a given individual held 
the attitudes he held would be more attracted to that indi­
vidual than persons not provided such background informa­
tion," the researchers again utilized a "booklet format" to 
construct the manipulations and to provide the dependent 
measures. Eight different versions of the booklets were 
formed, with each booklet focusing on "an interview" between 
the experimenter and Person X. In four versions, both atti­
tude and background similarity were included, with attitude 
similarity varying as a function of "liberal" versus "con­
servative" ratings on ten attitude statements. In two ad­
ditional versions, only background information was provided. 
Background information was manipulated via actual exchanges 
between the experimenter and Person X and consisted of two 
different levels of information: "rural" versus "urban"
background information concerning Person X. After randomiz­
ing booklets such that "students were randomly selected into 
one of the eight conditions" (p. 6), Ss were asked to read 
the booklets and to complete several scales.
Contrary to earlier findings, results of this investiga­
tion revealed only limited support for the hypotheses addressed
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in the study. Although strong correlations were observed 
between attitude similarity and attraction and, within same 
conditions of the study, the predicted inverse relationship 
between uncertainty and attraction was observed, the re­
searchers generally failed to find significant relationships 
between perceived similarity and uncertainty. In addition, 
the results failed to support the hypothesis that "negative 
affects generated by perceived dissimilarity can be deinten­
sified by providing additional information." Finally, the 
factor analysis of the uncertainty instruments used, as well 
as the experimental findings, suggested for Berger that what 
is meant by the construct of "uncertainty" needed to be 
clarified (Berger et al., 1976, p. 17). This same deduction 
has provided one impetus for the research in the current 
study.
Two additional studies also emerged as a function of 
this work by Berger and his associates, those of Weber (1978) 
and Motl (1979). Interested primarily in nonverbal indices 
of uncertainty, Motl investigated the attitude similarity- 
uncertainty-attraction relationship via both nonverbal and 
paper-and-pencil indexes of uncertainty. Results of his 
study showed that two nonverbal indexes of uncertainty, speech 
rate and role exchange, increased (t(2175) = 1.53, p < .10) 
and decreased (p < .05), respectively, during the first few 
minutes of subject interactions. In addition, attitude sim­
ilarity was found to be associated with lower exchange rates;
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"Activity," which was comprised factorially of speech rate, 
statement rate and gestures, was found to be more positively 
related to perceived attitude similarity. Conversely, "at­
tentiveness," whose factor structure consisted of eye contact 
and head nods, was more positively associated with perceived 
uncertainty and attraction.
Another related study that emerged from the Berger- 
Calabrese (1975) "uncertainty reduction theory" was that of 
Weber (1978). Weber investigated "the extent to which per­
ceptual complexity in construing the social situation would 
enable an individual to become cognizant of the perspective 
of another person encountered in the same situation and to 
reduce the level of uncertainty felt about that person" (p. 
5128) . Deriving her hypotheses from four of the "axioms" in 
the Berger-Calabrese theory of uncertainty, Weber found that, 
while perceptual complexity was not related to cognizance of 
another person's environmental perspective, increased complex­
ity was significantly related to reduced levels of uncertainty. 
In addition, perceived and actual similarities in attitudes 
toward the environment were associated with increased cogni­
zance and decreased levels of uncertainty. Finally, decreased 
uncertainty was found to be significantly associated with in­
creased conversational variety and intimacy, as well as with 
increased interpersonal attraction (Weber, 1978, p. 5128).
Although these five studies comprise the most direct as­
sessments by Berger and his associates of the attitude
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similarity-uncertainty-attraction relationship, a study by 
Clatterbuck (1979) also represents a major contribution to 
the uncertainty literature. In order to investigate several 
key axiomatic relationships as predicted by Berger and 
Calabrese (1975) , Clatterbuck (1979) tested the following 
four hypotheses: (1) measures of retroactive and proactive
attribution will correlate positively;^ (2) attributional 
confidence will correlate positively with interpersonal at­
traction; (3) attributional confidence will positively cor­
relate with the time that two individuals have known each 
other;^ and (4) attributional confidence will correlate posi­
tively with similarity between two individuals (Clatterbuck, 
p. 149). To test these hypotheses, Clatterbuck reanalyzed 
or summarized data reported in 17 published and unpublished 
studies by Berger and his associates. With regard to Hypoth­
esis 2, Clatterbuck found that a significant relationship 
existed between Byrne's (1971) Interpersonal Judgment Scale 
and the CL65 (r = .337, n = 81, p < .05) , a sixty-five item 
instrument said to tap retroactive attributional confidence.
In addition, five of nine studies that employed both the U S  
and CL7 (a seven-item scale tapping proactive attributional 
confidence) reported significant correlations. However, the 
correlations ranged from -.01 to .78, with an average corre­
lation of .36 (p. 153). The correlation between the McCroskey 
and McCain (1974) scales of attraction and the CL65 was tested 
in one study and was found to be significant (r = .449, n = 80,
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p < .05). Conversely, the correlation between the CL7 and 
the McCroskey-McCain scale was assessed in four studies, of 
which three were found to be significant. Correlations 
between these two measures ranged from .146 to .476 (average 
correlation = .363).
In order to test the relationship between similarity and 
attributional confidence, demographic/biographical, attitu- 
dinal, and behavioral similarity were also assessed in the 
Clatterbuck study. Demographic similarity was found to ex­
hibit a positive but nonsignificant correlation with the CL7 
(r = .179, n = 59, ns). Studies of attitude similarity, on 
the other hand, which manipulated attitudes of 0, 50 and 100% 
agreement, reported significant correlations between similar­
ity and attributional confidence. Finally, four studies 
were reported to have investigated behavioral similarity 
(via "normal" vs "nonnormal" conversational patterns in inter­
actions) , as reflected in transcripts of conversations between 
two strangers. Although, as Clatterbuck noted, Ss "recognized 
'normal' patterns to be different from 'deviant' conversation 
patterns, and although Ss tended to say that their own conver­
sations were similar to the 'normal' patterns, little influ­
ence was observed on the confidence levels of the Ss" 
(Clatterbuck, p. 155). Thus, of the operationalizations of 
similarity advanced by studies cited by Clatterbuck, most 
have produced negligible effects on attributional confidence.
Although the aforementioned studies provide useful in­
sights into the relationships among attitude similarity.
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uncertainty and attraction, the findings have been inconsis­
tent and contradictory. While earlier studies which utilized 
the bogus stranger technique have produced general support 
for a significant relationship among attitude similarity, un­
certainty and attraction, studies employing transcripted 
interactions have produced, at best, limited support. Addi­
tionally, correlations among the variables have ranged from 
weak and nonsignificant to statistically significant and 
strong.
One reason for the existence of such conflicting results, 
as I have argued, may have been an overemphasis on the use 
of non-face-to-face interactions and on the sole use of such 
research procedures in a research program designed to inves­
tigate developments in initial interactions. Indeed, one 
need look no further than the calculation of the omega-squares 
for each of the aforementioned studies (where appropriate) to 
see the actual strength of the relationships among attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction. No such measures 
were reported in the Berger et al studies; thus, the decision 
was made to report the calculation of these measures at this 
time. These values are presented in Table 1 on the following 
page.
Although the calculation of the omega-squares for Berger's 
studies and the existing contradictions in the literature may 
call into question the validity and usefulness of "uncertainty" 
to the attraction literature, intuitively, one alternative
23
TABLE 1
OMEGA-SQUARES FOR STUDIES PREVIOUSLY CITED 










attitude similarity and 
social attraction
20.47 .1136
attitude similarity and 
physical attraction
4.34 .0215
attitude similarity and 
task attraction
14.00 .0788















no. of compliments and 
uncertainty
5.24 .0195
sex and uncertainty 3.86 .0133
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argument may be made: namely, that the theory has not been
tested in the most appropriate manner possible —  through 
the use of actual face-to-face interactions.
Two researchers who recently have been concerned with 
this issue and who have attempted to address attitude similar­
ity and attraction in interpersonal settings are Sunnafrank 
and Miller. In the process of arguing for and utilizing 
face-to-face interactions, however, these authors have created 
two additional problems. First, they have overlooked consis­
tently the statistical interdependency problem, a possibility 
whenever data are generated through the use of dyads. Second, 
they have left untested their assumption that "the need for a 
stable, predictable and controllable environment" (i.e., un­
certainty) is the mediating variable between attitude similar­
ity and attraction, an assumptive stance rather than an empir­
ical question which could have been avoided had the research­
ers actually tested for the concept of uncertainty.
Although these studies indeed are problematic as a func­
tion of these two oversights, they offer useful insights for 
the researcher who is interested in the attitude similarity- 
attraction question. For this reason, both studies are re­
viewed in the subsequent section, following a clearer expli­
cation of the interdependency problem in face-to-face inter­
actions .
Studies of Sunnafrank and Miller 
As the reader will note in the paragraphs to follow, 
researchers who have focused on the attitude similarity-
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uncertainty-attraction relationship have often overlooked the 
interdependency of behavior when employing face-to-face inter­
actions. This interdependency results whenever two or more 
persons interact during a given research task and invariably 
produces data which are statistically correlated (i.e., 
interdependent).
As a function of the existence of this potential inter­
dependency, researchers traditionally have attempted to cope 
with the problem in one of two ways: (1) by ignoring the
existence of the statistical interdependency or (2) attempt­
ing to eliminate it, since most statistical procedures do 
not allow for it (Kraemer and Jacklin, 1979, p. 217). Methods 
of eliminating the interdependency between a subject's and 
his/her partner's data have included the use of confederates, 
the use of dyadic scores, or the use of pair average scores. 
Techniques such as these allow the researcher to avoid the 
statistical dependency problem (p. 217) . Conversely, other 
researchers have chosen to ignore the interdeoendencv and 
have treated the scores of each partner as if they were in­
dependent. As a result, their statistical tests potentially 
have harbored three major problems: (1) a violation of the
statistical independence assumption; (2) the subsequent over- 
or under-estimation of the variance of one's parameter esti­
mates, depending on the true structure of the particular vari­
ance-covariance matrix or matrices, and (3) the possibility 
of incorrect statements regarding the significance of one's 
findings.
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Although both approaches to the interdependency problem 
have been employed by researchers, several have chosen the 
latter technique and, as a result, have called into question 
the significance of their results. Two such researchers in 
the attraction literature are Michael Sunnafrank and Gerald 
Miller, although their research provides useful insights into 
the study of attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction. 
For this reason, the goals and subsequent findings of these 
researchers are presented in the following paragraphs.
As Sunnafrank and Miller (1981) have noted, research us­
ing the bogus-stranger technique has produced a variety of 
information concerning variables that may influence preacquain­
tance attraction. This research has provided much information 
concerning research in the area of attraction as well as re­
garding the specific research question addressed in this 
thesis. However, for Sunnafrank and Miller, what was not 
clear from prior research was "how preinteraction knowledge 
concerning attitude similarity combines with the typically 
nonattitudinal information exchanged during initial interac­
tions to influence interpersonal attraction" (p. 17). To 
address this concern, these researchers examined "the possi­
ble independent and conjoint effects of initial interaction 
and attitude similarity" on interpersonal attraction (p. 17). 
The explanatory frameworks on which the study was based were 
those of Altman and Taylor (1973) , Heider (1958), Berger and 
Calabrese (1975) and Miller and Steinberg (1975) .
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In order to test the hypothesized relationship between 
preinteraction knowledge and information gained in a face-to- 
face interaction., Ss were made aware that they were paired 
with either an attitudinally similar or dissimilar stranger, 
and one half of the participants subsequently were asked to 
engage in "normal get-acquainted conversation." The remain­
ing participants were not allowed to meet their partners, as 
is typical in most bogus stranger research. Results of the 
study indicated that initial interaction and attitude similar­
ity combined "nonadditively" to influence attraction between 
relative strangers. While initial interaction was found to 
have a positive affect on attraction, this condition held 
true only for individuals paired with attitudinally dissim­
ilar partners. In addition, individuals paired with atti­
tudinally similar partners were more attracted to each other 
than were attitudinally dissimilar partners, but only in the 
no interaction condition. However, neither Hypothesis 2 
which predicted a positive influence on attraction regardless 
of the state of attitude similarity, nor Hypothesis 3 which 
predicted the positive affect of attitude similarity on at­
traction regardless of interaction level, were supported. 
Sunnafrank and Miller concluded that the attitude similarity- 
attraction relationship may become "highly ephemeral" when 
observed within the framework of normal conversational inter­
actions (Sunnafrank and Miller, 1981) .
Sunnafrank and Miller (1981) did not directly assess the 
mediating effects of uncertainty in the attitude similarity-
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attraction relationship, although they did argue that one 
possible explanation for their findings was the need for indi­
viduals to maintain a stable, predictable and controllable 
environment. For example, to explain the finding that the 
attraction scores of attitudinally dissimilar Ss after con­
versing were not significantly different from those of sim­
ilar Ss, Sunnafrank and Miller argued that the conversations 
themselves should have led Ss to perceive that future inter­
actions with the other individual would be stable, predicta­
ble and controllable. What these authors overlooked, however, 
was the statistical interdependency of their data, which re­
sulted when they employed both sets of attraction scores from 
participants in each of their dyads. They also overlooked 
the possibility of directly testing the potential affects of 
uncertainty on attitude similarity and attraction. As a re­
sult of the first oversight, they called into question the 
actual significance of their findings as well as the strain 
of research they are attempting to develop. As a result of 
the latter decision, they left untested their explanatory 
framework.
Although their 1981 study violated the statistical inde­
pendence assumption, in a subsequent study Sunnafrank (1983) 
repeated the identical statistical problems. This later 
study also left untested the primary relationship of inter­
est —  namely, the potential mediating effects of interper­
sonal uncertainty.
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Based on the "findings" of Sunnafrank and Miller (1981) , 
Sunnafrank (1983) was interested in further determining 
whether procedural differences might account for the finding 
of other researchers (e.g., Byrne and Griffith, 1968) that,
"if individuals discuss the attitudinal topics constituting 
similarity or dissimilarity during initial conversations, 
the usual positive attitude similarity-attraction relation­
ship [should] remain intact" (Sunnafrank and Miller, p. 277). 
As Sunnafrank noted, such findings were seemingly contradic­
tory when considered in light of the findings in his earlier 
1981 study. The research question which emerged was:
If individuals who are aware that a relative stranger 
is attitudinally similar or dissimilar to them are 
equally attracted to one another after typical ini­
tial conversational stages, what will happen next to 
attraction levels during the next conversational 
stage when they begin to discuss the topics of this 
similarity or dissimilarity? (p. 278)
Based on his belief that individuals are unlikely to reintro­
duce threats to their communication goals once those goals 
have been achieved, Sunnafrank hypothesized the existence of 
three major relationships:
Individuals who are aware they are paired with atti­
tudinally dissimilar partners will be less attracted 
to their partner prior to conversing with them than 
after either a normal initial conversation with them 
or after this type of conversation followed by a dis­
cussion of the topics constituting the known dissim­
ilarity. Moreover, attitudinally similar partners 
will be more attracted to one another than attitudin­
ally dissimilar partners only prior to conversing 
with them. (p. 278)
Utilizing procedures similar to those in the initial 
study, results of this subsequent study revealed a significant
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interaction effect for conversational stage (preconversation, 
initial conversation, and initial conversation followed by 
attitude discussion) and attitudinal similarity (F(2,139 = 
19.99, p < .05), as well as significant main effects for con­
versational stage, attitude similarity, and sex (F(2,139) = 
7.48, p < .05; F (1,139) = 17.51, p < .05; and F(l,139) = 7.51, 
p < .05 for each effect, respectively). In addition, 
Sunnafrank's analysis revealed "that partners who engaged in 
initial conversations were more attracted to one another than 
pre-conversation partners when partners were dissimilar but 
not when the partners were similar" (p. 282). Dissimilar 
partners who engaged in an initial conversation followed by 
an attitude discussion also were more attracted to one another 
than were their similar conversation counterparts. Only in 
the pre-conversation condition were attitudinally similar Ss 
more attracted to one another than attitudinally similar Ss. 
Sunnafrank concluded that the influence of attitude similar­
ity on attraction is limited to the pre-conversational stage, 
"when somewhat normal communication processes are followed, 
at least in beginning communicative relationships" (p. 283). 
When individuals are allowed to go through normal initial 
interactions prior to discussing attitudinally salient topics, 
attitude similarity generally fails to exert a "significant 
influence" on attraction (p. 284).
Again, the reader should note that these findings are 
questionable in light of Sunnafrank's (1983) violation of the 
statistical independence assumption. Like his earlier study
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with Miller, Sunnafrank analyzed data from both of the sub­
jects in each of his dyads, treating each score as independent 
and employing all scores in his data analysis. As a result, 
the potential exists that his resulting F-ratios were highly 
inflated and, therefore, acted as either under-estimations 
of the population variance or over-estimations of the between 
group variance. Additionally, this inappropriate use of 
statistical procedures in both of the Sunnafrank and Miller 
studies calls into question the overall program of research. 
Finally, the omega-squares, calculated for each of the inde­
pendent-dependent variable combinations in the latter study 
and reported in Table 2, reveal the problematic nature of this 
research.
The Uncertainty Construct 
Although methodological and statistical weaknesses repre­
sent two problems which explain the existence of conflicting 
results in the uncertainty literature, another weakness which 
compounds the problem is the existence of no significant, 
comprehensive operationalization of the uncertainty construct. 
Although this conclusion by no means is an indictment of the 
research literature overall, it does call into question a cur­
rent approach in Communication, whose foundation is based on 
the concept of uncertainty. For this reason the overall li­
terature concerning measures of uncertainty were consulted.
Out of this literature emerged four major areas of concern:
(1) early studies in Psychology which focused on the concept
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of subjective probability; (2) the CLUES instruments con­
structed by Clatterbuck (1979), which focused primarily on 
attributional confidence; (3) linguistic indicators of un­
certainty; and (4) measures of uncertainty designed to ful­
fill research needs in specific, independent research inves­
tigations. Each of these respective approaches to the mea­
surement of uncertainty will be addressed in the following 
pages.
The Concept of Subjective Probability 
The concept of subjective probability and its measure­
ment came to fruition in the late 1960's and early seventies 
and focused on individuals' prediction of outcomes under 
varying conditions of complete or incomplete information. 
Primarily, the goal of this research was to establish
whether judgments based on partial information fol­
low their own psychological rules in a more or less 
consistent fashion and how these rules compare with 
rules of mathematical probability based on logical 
criteria (Cohen and Hansel, 1955a; in Bell, 1979, 
pp. 7-8).
As Bell (1979) noted, two fundamental conclusions were drawn
from this body of research:
The first is that in conditions of uncertainty 
people behave neither blindly nor randomly . . .  ; 
the second is that in many instances human behav­
ior departs significantly from that which would 
be predicted by a model of man based on mathema­
tical probability . . . (pp. 7-8).
To support these findings, researchers cited studies concern­
ing subjects' treatment of equiprobable or independent events;
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in short, these events were not treated as either independent 
or equiprobable. Instead, subject preferences often were ex­
pressed when there was no mathematical justification. In 
addition, concepts like hope, pessimism and fairness intruded 
into subjects' judgments.
Early studies concerning this conception of uncertainty 
included studies by Cohen and Hansel (1955a, 1955b), Cohen, 
Dearnaley and Hansel (1956, 1957, 1958a, 1958b), and Cohen 
and Cooper (1961a, 1961b). These studies focused on events 
such as children's predictions of equiprobable outcomes, 
which revealed a predominant choice by Ss of subjective psy­
chological probabilities over statistical probabilities when 
placed in conditions reflecting uncertain outcomes (Cohen 
and Hansel, 1955a) . These researchers also identified two 
major sources of uncertainty: estimates of skill at a task
and estimates of chance affecting event outcomes (Cohen, 
Dearnaley and Hansel, 1958a, 1958b).
Of specific interest also to this group of researchers 
were Ss' perceptions of the operation of chance rules in 
lotteries. As summarized by Bell (1979), results of these 
and other studies revealed: (1) that when chances of draw­
ing a winning ticket were low (0.1) Ss tended to operate on 
the basis of an inflated subjective probability of success;
(2) that when the chances of drawing a winning ticket were 
high (0.9), the majority of Ss overestimated their subjective 
probability of losing; and (3) when the chances of winning
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and losing are equiprobable, subjective probabilities clearly 
discriminated between two types of persons: Ss who desired to
maximize the chances of success and Ss who desired to minimize 
the chances of failure (abstracted from Bell, 1979, pp. 10-11), 
Although these earlier studies did not address uncertainty in 
interpersonal interactions, they did provide a foundation 
for studies concerning the nature of interpersonal uncertainty.
Measures of Uncertainty in 
Human Interactions 
The work of Clatterbuck (1979), which focused on proac­
tive and retroactive attribution processes in uncertainty, 
represents the only major attempt in Communication to opera­
tionalize the uncertainty construct. Although individual 
measures have been constructed to fulfill specific research 
needs, the CLUES scales have emerged as the primary means of 
assessing "uncertainty" in human interactions.
Based on Berger and Calabrese's (1975) distinction be­
tween the predictive and explanatory processes comprising 
the uncertainty concept, Clatterbuck (1979) operationalized 
uncertainty as "attributional confidence," either in retro­
active explanations or in proactive predictions of behavior. 
Arguing that uncertainty is primarily reduced by "the provi­
sion of information that is perceived as adequate for the 
making of necessary decisions," Clatterbuck further hypothe­
sized that the absolute information which a person possesses 
becomes an insufficient predictor of uncertainty reduction.
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For this reason, Clatterbuck conceptualized uncertainty as 
attributional confidence —  a conceptualization which em­
phasized the perceived adequacy of one's information to make 
retroactive and proactive attributions (p. 148).
In attempting to operationalize these two hypothetical 
constructs (i.e., retroactive and proactive attributional 
confidence), Clatterbuck (1979) treated retroactive confidence 
as the "summative confidence expressed in [one's] factual 
knowledge of [another]" (p. 149). Out of this operational­
ization emerged a 65-item instrument (CL65), which consisted 
of questions constructed from a ten percent (10%) stratified 
sample of the intimacy-scale items reported by Taylor and 
Altman (1966) . To complete the instrument, Ss are asked to 
state their confidence levels regarding their perceived abil­
ity to give specific facts about a target person; however, 
they are not asked to produce these specific facts. Scoring 
is usually based on 0 - 100% confidence, with 0% defined as 
"a total guess" and 100% confidence as "total certainty." 
Reliability estimates for the CL65 have ranged from a 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .952 to .989 (Clatterbuck, 
1979, p. 152).
Unlike retroactive attributional confidence, which as­
sesses one's perceived ability to explain another's actions 
or behaviors, proactive attributional confidence is measured 
by the summative confidence that one has in his/her predic­
tions concerning another individual. This construct is
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operationalized via a seven-item instrument (CL7) and "is 
derived from topic areas or categories suggested by Berger 
and Calabrese" (p. 149). Like the CL65, items comprising 
the CL7 usually are scored on a scale from 0 - 100%; how­
ever, scales of four and nine units also have been utilized. 
Reliability estimates for the CL7 range from an alpha of 
.763 to .975, with only three of the 16 studies which 
Clatterbuck (1979) reports as having utilized the instrument 
reporting reliability coefficients less than .85. Factor 
analyses of both instruments, in addition, suggest that the 
indexes are internally consistent and unidimensional, with 
the principle component solution providing the most appro­
priate model for the data. The first factor of the solution 
accounted for at least 60% of the variance, and all items 
loaded at .50 or greater on the initial factor.
Although the CLUES instruments, as they also are labeled, 
represent "reliable" indexes of the uncertainty construct, 
several findings also reported by Clatterbuck call into ques­
tion the construct validity of the scales in their current 
form. First, although the CL65 and the CL7 were found to be 
unidimensional and internally consistent when individually 
analyzed, correlations between the two instruments were found 
to range from .64 to .95. Although as Clatterbuck notes, 
this result is consistent with the Berger-Calabrese analysis 
that retroactive and proactive attributional processes are 
closely linked, the problem lies in his subsequent suggestion
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that, "to the extent that attributional confidence is used as 
a surrogate for the unmeasurable construct of uncertainty 
reduction, either form of the CLUES instrument may be used 
to test hypotheses involving uncertainty" (p. 153). In light 
of the range of correlation coefficients that he reports, 
such a suggestion appears highly questionable. Perhaps a 
more valid solution might be the construction of a multi­
dimensional scale which taps at least both dimensions of un­
certainty .
Second, Clatterbuck*s (1979) discussion of the validity 
of his scales is restricted to their concurrent validity, 
without the provision of adequate evidence justifying his 
claims and without an account of other types of validity con­
cerning the scales. For example, the validation procedures 
that Clatterbuck reports consisted, first, in the identifica­
tion of variables which might "counterfeit" or "intervene" 
in the effects of attributional confidence; these variables 
included empathy, extroversion, dogmatism, tolerance of am­
biguity, self-esteem, neuroticism, and social desirability. 
Second, Clatterbuck calculated the correlations between the 
CL65 and CL7 and the scales representing these seven constructs 
Although Clatterbuck's finding that none of the seven scales 
significantly correlated with the CLUES instruments is used 
as evidence to support the existence of concurrent validity, 
the validity of the scales remains in question. First, nega­
tive evidence is not evidence of an instrument's concurrent
39
validity; such data merely support what a particular instru­
ment is not. Thus, a more appropriate indicator of the CLUES 
instruments' concurrent validity might be an analysis of their 
respective correlations with other related criterion measures. 
Second, the construct validity of the scales remain in ques­
tion. For example, adequate testing has not been conducted 
to determine the potential discriminability of his measures. 
Perhaps an appropriate indicator of their construct validity 
might be their ability to discriminate varying levels of un­
certainty in contexts hypothesized to create specific levels 
of uncertainty.
Although to this point much time and space have been al­
lotted to a discussion and critique of these specific instru­
ments, such a treatment indeed seems warranted. As I shall 
argue in the following pages, if the remaining instruments to 
be presented are equally insufficient, more comprehensive mea­
sures of the uncertainty concept must be constructed. Such 
operationalizations become even more essential if we are to 
substantiate the value of the uncertainty approach. Unless 
proponents of "uncertainty reduction theory" can support the 
value of their interpersonal communication model, the theore­
tical base from which they argue will crumble.
Linguistic Indexes of Uncertainty
Four studies concerning the uncertainty concept accent 
linguistic indices. These studies include research conducted 
by Siegman and Pope (1965, 1966), by Lalljie and Cook in 1973, 
and more recently by Motl (1979).
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Hypothesizing that filled pauses and speech rate would 
vary as a function of levels of uncertainty, Siegman and 
Pope (1965, 1966) conceptualized uncertainty as the range of 
possible responses available to a communicator. High uncer­
tainty situations were defined as those in which a subject 
had a wide range of possible responses, while low uncertainty 
situations were operationalized as those having a narrow 
range of responses. Manipulating question specificity in one 
study (1965) and Thematic Apperception Test ambiguity in the 
other (1966) , these researchers reported that filled pause 
rate grew with increasing levels of uncertainty in both in­
stances. Conversely, an inverse relationship was found be­
tween speech rate and uncertainty.
Basing their investigation on the work of Siegman and 
Pope, Lalljie and Cook (1973) likewise addressed linguistic 
indices of uncertainty. Unlike Siegman and Pope, however, 
these researchers treated uncertainty as a dependent variable 
and conceptualized uncertainty itself in terms of filled 
pause rate and speech rate. They hypothesized that as a 
face-to-face interaction progresses, increased feedback fa­
cilitates a communicator's linguistic choices. To test these 
hypotheses, Ss interacted with one of the experimenters for 
approximately nine minutes, and tapes of the interactions 
were transcribed. Results of the study confirmed their ini­
tial, overall hypothesis: Filled pause rate decreased and
speech rate increased as a function of the progressing inter­
action .
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Motl's (1979) study was designed to test hypotheses de­
rived from the Berger-Calabrese uncertainty theory of inter­
action and focused on "nonverbal indicators" of uncertainty. 
Operationalizing uncertainty in terms of (1) speech rate,
(2) statement rate, (3) speaker-listener role exchanges, (4) 
eye contact, (5) head nods, and (6) gestures (and measuring 
each variable at 30-second intervals of subject interactions), 
Motl found that speech rate increased (t(2175) = 1.53, p < .10) 
and role exchange decreased(p <.05)during the first few min­
utes, as expected. In addition, Motl discovered that atti­
tude similarity, the independent variable in the study, was 
significantly correlated with lower role exchange rates, as 
predicted. Finally, analyses of the intercorrelations of the 
interaction behaviors revealed the existence of two independ­
ent factors; (1) "activity," which included speech rate, 
statement rate, and gestures, and (2) "attentiveness," pri­
marily associated with eye contact and head nods. Concerning 
the correlations of the two factors to attitude similarity,
Motl found that activity was more positively associated with 
perceived similarity. Conversely, attentiveness was found to 
correlate more highly with paper-and-pencil tests of uncer­
tainty and attraction.
Although linguistic indexes provide a third means by 
which the concept of uncertainty may be operationalized, one 
may argue that they provide only a partial understanding of 
the uncertainty construct. For example, if an argument could
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be made that uncertainty is best defined as a cognitive state 
of being, behavioral indices, by nature, would not provide 
the most comprehensive treatment. Because such an argument 
is currently made in the Communication literature, linguistic 
indexes necessarily should be accompanied by self-report mea­
sures, or paper-and-pencil tests.
That Motl (1979) violated the statistical independence 
assumption by using all of the data generated by his Ss con­
founds the "linguistic index" literature as well and calls 
into question both his results as well as the study's ability 
to contribute to the language literature. For these reasons, 
the contributions of linguistic indexes may best be accompan­
ied by additional measures.
Uncertainty Measures Designed 
for Specific Research Needs 
Although several studies have emerged which incorporate 
operationalizations of uncertainty that address specific in­
vestigative needs, two such studies are of primary interest 
to this study: Mascaro (1970) and Muse (1975) . Both have
offered operationalizations of uncertainty varying in content 
and scope, but each has contributed to a clearer understand­
ing of the uncertainty concept. For this reason, their stud­
ies will be reviewed briefly in the following pages.
Much as the author is concerned with the possible proce­
dural biases that have emerged in studies of uncertainty, so 
Mascaro (1970) believed that the variety and complexity of
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similarity manipulations employed may account for possible 
inconsistencies in the current literature. Attempting to 
correct for these biases, Mascaro tested the hypothesis that 
judgmental similarity (i.e., the proportion of similar judg­
ments between two individuals) increases interpersonal at­
traction and reduces interpersonal uncertainty. Upon enter­
ing the experimental session, Ss were given an answer sheet 
with two possible choices per item (A or B) and a series of 
five-point confidence rating scales after each item number 
(the combination of these two constituted Mascaro*s "pre­
certainty" measure). In addition, Ss were given two answer 
cards upon which the letters "A" and "B" were placed. Indi­
vidual pairs of Ss and confederates (the latter, posed as Ss) 
were then instructed that a series of items would be projected 
on a screen. Their task would be to fill in the answer sheet 
and to give an answer card to the experimenter after each 
item was projected.
Subsequently, ten binary, multiple-choice items concern­
ing different issues were projected. After each projected 
item, both the Ss and the confederates were required to fill 
in their responses on the answer sheets and to hand in the 
appropriate answer card. The experimenter then projected both 
the Ss' and confederates' respective answers for 15 seconds so 
that each would know what answer the other individual had se­
lected.
Because the confederate turned in both answer cards, the 
actual degree of similarity was manipulated by the experimenter,
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who projected the bogus answers according to a randomly de­
termined schedule of similarity (20%, 50%, and 80% similarity, 
respectively). At the end of the experimental session, Ss 
were given the seven-item Interpersonal Judgment Scale (Byrne, 
1971) and a six-item post-certainty questionnaire asking Ss 
to estimate the percentage of items on which they felt "very 
certain" to "very uncertain."
Results of the study revealed a significant difference 
in attraction scores across levels of judgmental similarity- 
dissimilarity (F = 7.46, p < .01). However, no significant 
differences were found with regard to the uncertainty measures 
(F = .62, F = .69 for the pre- and post-test uncertainty mea­
sures, respectively). Such low F-ratios in this instance and 
the calculation of omega-square = .1068 for attraction across 
levels of similarity suggest a measurement problem which 
Mascaro only indirectly acknowledged; he concluded that the 
lack of significant effects on uncertainty may have resulted 
from methodological factors. As he stated, "Since Ss answered 
the pre-certainty questionnaire by giving a certainty rating 
on each item, before their judgments on that item were re­
vealed, increases in certainty on such items may [have re­
flected] only the effects of similarity-dissimilarity on 
previous items" (Mascaro, p. 74). In addition, administration 
of the pre-certainty questionnaire may have restricted the 
range of responses on the post-certainty index.
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A second study which offers potential insights into the 
present study is that of Muse (1975), who focused on (1) the 
distinctions between evaluative and structural similarity and 
(2) their respective effects on interpersonal attraction. Al­
though not directly interested in the concept of uncertainty, 
Muse was interested in what he labeled "communication effec­
tiveness," or Ss' ability to predict their partner's responses 
on two attitude surveys which he incorporated into his study. 
To test his hypothesis that both types of similarity would be 
related to "communication effectiveness" and interpersonal at­
traction, Muse had Ss complete an attitude survey on the topic 
of education and a second survey designed to tap the related­
ness of pairs of attitude items. Four groups of ten male- 
female dyads were then constructed, such that Ss were placed 
in groups either High-High, High-Low, Low-High, or Low-Low in 
evaluative and structural similarity, respectively. Ss then 
engaged in a twenty-minute conversation concerning the topic 
of education. Results of the study revealed that structural 
similarity facilitated prediction of attitude structures but 
did not facilitate prediction of evaluative positions on the 
attitude items. Evaluative similarity, on the other hand, 
facilitated prediction of evaluative positions, but did not 
facilitate prediction of attitude structures. The hypothesis 
that evaluative similarity would further enhance communicative 
effectiveness in structurally similar dyads also was not sup­
ported, nor were his hypotheses that both evaluative and
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structural similarity significantly would affect interpersonal 
attraction. Instead, an interaction effect resulted such that 
Ss in the High-High and Low-Low groups were less attracted to 
one another relative to Ss in the High-Low and Low-High condi­
tions .
Although the results of this study conflict with other 
studies concerning the effects of evaluative and structural 
similarity on attraction (e.g., Johnson and Tesser, 1972), Muse 
did find support for the hypothesis that perceived structural 
and evaluative similarity facilitated prediction of attitude 
structure and evaluative judgments, respectively. However, 
Muse's results overall become questionable in light of another 
violation of the statistical independence assumption, which 
requires that the data (i.e., scores) utilized in his analy­
sis be independent. Because Muse used the "communication ef­
fectiveness" and attraction scores of both participants in 
his constructed dyads, the scores of dyadic members should 
have been treated as correlated. Instead, Muse violated the 
independence assumption when he treated the scores as inde­
pendent, thereby either increasing the probability that his 
F-ratios were liberal in the event of positive correlations, 
or conservative in the event of negative correlations.
To this point in the discussion, I have documented an 
argument that no comprehensive and proven measures of uncer­
tainty exist in the current literature. In addition, I have 
argued that the existence of such a measure is essential if
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researchers are to attempt an understanding of the relation­
ships among attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction. 
Having completed this discussion, we now turn to a summary of 
the literature overall, including both the attitude similarity- 
uncertainty-attraction literature and those studies which have 
attempted to operationalize the uncertainty construct. Fol­
lowing this summary, four major research questions which 
emerged from the overall research question will be articulated.
Summary and Research Questions
In returning to the literature which has been reviewed 
thus far, perhaps the arguments made at the beginning of this 
chapter represent the most succinct and cogent statement con­
cerning the "state of the art" in the uncertainty literature. 
First, research concerning the relationships among attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction has produced a morass 
of inconsistent and contradictory findings. One potential 
contributor to this problem may have been an overemphasis on 
the use of non-face-to-face interactions as a research para­
digm.
Second, of those studies which have employed face-to- 
face interactions, many have not accounted for the interde­
pendency problem when using dyadic data. As a result, such 
studies include within them violations of the statistical in­
dependence assumption and have produced questionable results 
and tenuous programs of research. For example, of the two 
studies previously cited which insightfully employed the use
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of "normal" face-to-face interactions, both may be accused 
of statistical violations.
Third, the explanatory framework of uncertainty often 
has remained assumed when it would have been more appropriate 
to recognize the hypothesized relationship between uncertainty 
and other variables as an empirical question. It is impor­
tant for researchers to understand assumptions of a theory, 
but they should not assume that which could be successfully 
tested. As a result, uncertainty studies which take such a 
stance have provided an interesting explanation for the atti­
tude similarity-attraction relationship. However, failure to 
test that which is testable handicaps the future usefulness 
of this line of research.
Finally, of the studies reviewed in this thesis, none 
have produced a viable and comprehensive measure of uncer­
tainty. Although Clatterbuck's (1979) CL65 and CL7 have come 
the closest to clearly articulating the uncertainty construct, 
questions remain concerning the validity of the two scales.
As a function of the current "state of the art" in the 
uncertainty literature, particularly in the areas of attitude 
similarity and attraction, four specific research questions 
emerged for this researcher from the overall research ques­
tion previously presented. First, regarding the concept of 
uncertainty, specifically:
1. By what vehicle may the construct of uncertainty 
best be understood (i.e., conceptualized)?
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2. Can a valid and reliable "self report" measure 
of uncertainty be constructed as a function of 
its current conceptualization in the litera­
ture?
Second, regarding the relationships among attitude similarity, 
uncertainty and attraction:
3. Are key studies that have been conducted 
replicable, given the use of appropriate and 
correctly employed statistical procedures?
4. Given a positive response to these specific 
questions, can uncertainty be considered for 
candidacy as a mediating variable between 
attitude similarity and attraction?
It is to an address of each of these questions and the methods
by which they were addressed that the author now turns.
CHAPTER II 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
In order to address the research questions advanced in 
Chapter I of this thesis, a two-phase investigation was under­
taken. Phase I consisted of the construction of a measure of 
interpersonal uncertainty and partially addressed the first 
two research questions presented in Chapter I. Phase 2 fo­
cused on the execution of an experiment designed to partially 
address the construct validity of the newly developed uncer­
tainty scale. In addition, the latter phase was designed to 
correct for statistical errors in previous pertinent research, 
while at the same time directly testing several key assump­
tions in the uncertainty literature. In this way. Phase 2 
addressed Research Questions Two, Three and Four. The meth­




Participants who completed this phase of the study were 
575 students enrolled in a multisectioned, basic Communication 
course at one major southern and one major midwestern university.
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Subjects ranged from 17 to 33 years in age, with an average 
age of 20.3 years. Approximately three to four weeks into the 
respective terms, participants were asked to complete a two- 
item attitude survey, to read and process information from the 
same attitude survey as it allegedly had been completed by a 
student at another major university, and to form an impression 
of that individual based on the bogus responses. The purpose 
of this procedure was to identify a factor structure which 
would generalize across four levels of attitude similarity. 
Once Ss had completed this task, they were asked to complete 
a third attitude survey, which constituted a validity check 
concerning the attitude similarity manipulation. In addition, 
they completed a 65-item measure of interpersonal uncertainty 
designed to be tested and validated in Phase 1 of the study.
Procedures
Interpersonal uncertainty was defined as the degree of 
confidence that an individual had concerning his/her ability 
to predict, explain and influence another individual's behav­
ior, attitudes, values, beliefs, etc. This definition was 
grounded in the work of Berger and his associates and was 
operationalized via a 65-item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. 
This instrument was derived from an extensive review of the 
uncertainty literature and was operationalized through the 
use of seven-point, Likert-type rating scales. In the form of 
two booklets, the overall instrument consisted of two separate 
parts. Booklet I contained (1) an information sheet through
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which Ss' background information was assessed, (2) a two- 
item dichotomous attitude survey to be completed by the 
respondent, and (3) a second, identical attitude survey which 
allowed the creation of four possible combinations of similar­
ity via the use of bogus stranger-type responses. Booklet II 
contained a three-item manipulation check concerning perceived 
attitude similarity with the bogus stranger and the 55-item 
Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. The scoring procedure for 
the latter was based on a summation across those items iden­
tified in the principle components analysis once the analyses 
were completed. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
four attitude similarity conditions via the randomization of 
four different versions of Attitude Survey 2 (the bogus ques­
tionnaire) in Booklet I. Booklet I is presented in Appendix 
A and includes the cover letter, the information sheet and 
Attitude Survey 1. The bogus stranger attitude questionnaire 
(i.e., the four different manipulations of attitude similarity/ 
dissimilarity) is provided in Appendix B, and the perceived 
attitude similarity manipulation check is presented in Appen­
dix C. To complete the presentation of the information con­
tained in Booklets I and II, the 65-item Interpersonal Uncer­
tainty Scale is provided in Appendix D.
Reliability and Validity of the Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale 
In order to determine the dimensionality of the 65-item 
Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, the instrument was subjected
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to a principle components analysis with varimax rotation.
Such a procedure allows the researcher to determine the po­
tential existence of an underlying factor structure, i.e., 
to optimize his or her chances of determining the minimum 
number of hypothetical variables that can account for the 
observed covariation which exists among a group of items or 
variables. The selection of the items which loaded was made 
on the basis of the Scree Test, as well as the purity of the 
items loading on the factor structure. As suggested by 
McCroskey and Young (1979), a .60 - .40 purity index was used 
for the selection of factor items. More specifically, if an 
item had a loading of at least .60 on one factor and a load­
ing of less than .40 on all other factors, the item was con­
sidered representative of that factor. Finally, at least 
five items were required to load before those items were con­
sidered as constituting a factor.
Although the principle components analysis and its cor­
responding statistics (e.g., communalities) provided one use­
ful index of the validity of the overall factor structure, 
this analysis alone could not provide a complete assessment 
of the instrument's construct validity. For this reason, a 
second set of analyses were conducted in order to determine 
the potential "contribution" of additional variables to the 
amount of variance explained by the interpersonal uncertainty 
construct. These analyses included the use of univariate 
analyses of variance, multiple classification analyses, and/or
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the calculation of Pearson product-moment correlation coeffi­
cients for interpersonal uncertainty and such variables as 
university, age, year, sex and level of attitude similarity 
(0, 50, and 100% agreement). As with all of the analyses 
employed in this study, the .05 level of significance was 
designated for all statistical tests. However, in order to 
be perceived as meaningful, all correlation coefficients 
were required to reach a level of .80 or greater. Should any 
of the aforementioned variables be found to have a signifi­
cant and meaningful influence on interpersonal uncertainty, 
the validity of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale could be 
called into question.
Third and, perhaps, the optimal test of the construct 
validity of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale was the util­
ization of the newly developed scale in Phase 2, the experi­
mental stage in this study. In order to directly assess the 
instrument's validity in this way. Phase 2 was designed to 
test several key assumptions in the literature concerning at­
titude similarity, uncertainty and attraction. It was rea­
soned that if significant differences could be found in Ss' 
perceived levels of interpersonal uncertainty across levels 
of attitude similarity and conversational stage, and if the 
cell means for interpersonal uncertainty were in the appro­
priate directions, one direct test of the instrument's con­
struct validity might be said to have been conducted. The 
methods of analysis for Phase 2 are described below.
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Finally, the internal reliability of the newly developed 
Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale was determined via the use of 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient. A reliability coefficient of 
.80 or greater was considered to be meaningful.
Manipulation Check
In order to determine the success of the attitude simil­
arity manipulation, data generated via the use of both indi­
vidual items and summated scores from Attitude Survey 3 were 
subjected to univariate analyses of variance, with .05 desig­
nated as the requisite probability level for significance. 
Attitude Survey 3 was a three-item instrument designed to tap 
the degree to which Ss perceived themselves and the bogus 
stranger to be attitudinally similar. Like both the original 
65-item uncertainty scale and the resulting Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale which emerged from the factor analysis, 
this instrument took the form of seven-point, Likert-type 
rating scales. Perceived attitude similarity, overall, was 
defined as a composite similarity score, or the summation 
across all three of the similarity items for a given subject.
Phase 2
Phase 2 of this study was designed to address the final 
two research questions, as well as to provide further evidence 
concerning the validity and reliability of the newly developed 
Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. To address question three, 
a partial replication of the work of Sunnafrank (1983) was
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completed, with corrections for his violations of the sta­
tistical independence assumption. Finally, in addressing 
question four, this phase attempted to assess the potential 
relationships among attitude similarity, uncertainty and 
attraction —  a relationship often assumed but untested in 
both the Sunnafrank research and in much of the uncertainty 
literature, overall. To test for this potential relationship, 
interpersonal uncertainty was introduced into Sunnafrank's 
(1983) model. It was hoped that this inclusion would allow 
the experimenter to partially validate the Interpersonal Un­
certainty Scale as well as to indirectly test Sunnafrank's 
implied explanation that "uncertainty" may intervene between 
attitude similarity and attraction. Although this study did 
not allow for a direct test of the hypothesis that "uncer­
tainty" mediates the attitude similarity-attraction relation­
ship, it was hoped that the study might determine whether un­
certainty is a potential candidate as a mediator. Thus, it 
would make possible a much needed foundation on which later 
studies may be built.
Subjects
Subjects for Phase II of the current study were 148 students 
enrolled in the multisectioned beginning Communication course 
and the basic Human Development course at a major southwestern 
university. Of that number, 52 actually participated in the 
study. Because prior research has produced conflicting results 
concerning possible gender effects in the interpersonal attraction
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literature, the decision was made to incorporate both male 
and female dyads in this phase of the study.^ Two weeks into 
the summer term, participants were administered a two-item 
attitude survey and were given the choice of several experi­
mental research times from which to choose for "a later 
meeting with the experimenter." Based on their initial re­
sponses to the attitude survey and the six or more times 
which they designated as times when they could meet, Ss were 
randomly paired with same-sexed partners and randomly assigned 
to experimental conditions, whenever possible.^ In addition, 
only four individuals were assigned to a given experimental 
session. Upon arriving to the experimental session, all part­
ners were asked whether they knew one another, before beginning. 
All Ss who were paired for the experiment responded in the ne­
gative. In addition, all Ss (with the exception of four stu­
dents from one section) were given extra credit points in their 
classes for participating.
Hypotheses
In order to assess one form of construct validity con­
cerning the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, while at the same 
time attempting to determine the replicability of Sunnafrank's 
(1983) study, the primary hypotheses of his 1983 study were 
tested. More specifically, two related hypotheses of both 
this and Sunnafrank's study were as follows;
Hypothesis lA: Individuals who are aware that they
are paired with an attitudinally
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dissimilar partner will be less 
attracted to their partners prior 
to conversing with them than after 
a normal initial conversation and 
after this type of conversation 
followed by a discussion of topics 
constituting a known dissimilarity. 
(Sunnafrank, 1983, p. 278)
Hypothesis IB; Moreover, attitudinally similar
partners will be more attracted to 
one another than attitudinally dis­
similar partners only prior to 
conversing with them. (p. 278)
In order to address the fourth research question, or the 
potential of interpersonal uncertainty as a mediating varia­
ble, interpersonal uncertainty was included in the Sunnafrank 
(1983) model. More specifically, the second group of hypoth­
eses read as follows:
Hypothesis 2A: Individuals who are aware that they
are paired with an attitudinally 
dissimilar partner will feel less 
certain of their ability to predict, 
explain, and influence their part­
ner's behavior (etc.) prior to con­
versing with them than after a 
normal initial conversation and af­
ter this type of conversation followed 
by an attitude discussion.
Hypothesis 2B: In addition, attitudinally similar
partners will feel more certain than 
attitudinally dissimilar partners 
only prior to conversing with them.
If, as Sunnafrank intimates, Ss' perceived uncertainty explains 
the attitude similarity-attraction data patterns found in his 
1983 study, the uncertainty data should reflect the same pat­
terns as found in the attraction data. More important for the 
current study, support for Hypotheses 2A and 2B would support
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the potential candidacy of uncertainty as a mediating varia­
ble between attitude similarity and attraction.
Variables and their Operationalization
Unlike Sunnafrank's (1983) study, which employed a 3 x 
2 x 2  independent groups design, the design constructed for 
this study was a 3 x 3 x 2 mixed design, with repeated mea­
sures on the second factor, conversational stage. The inde­
pendent variables for this study were attitude similarity, 
sex-type of dyad and conversational stage. "Attitude similar­
ity" consisted of three different levels of similarity (0, 50, 
or 100% attitude similarity) and was operationalized via the 
level of agreement by Ss, prior to their interactions in dyads, 
on two current controversial topics, nuclear power and abor­
tion. Although Sunnafrank (1983) employed only two levels of 
attitude similarity, three levels were employed in this study 
in order to utilize all possible combinations of attitude re­
sponses. To do so also allowed the experimenter to avoid the 
deceptions that were incorporated in the Sunnafrank study dur­
ing conversation two. The third independent variable, conver­
sational stage, consisted of three levels: pre-interaction,
post-initial interaction, and post-attitude discussion.
The dependent variables employed in this study were in­
terpersonal attraction and interpersonal uncertainty. The 
former was operationalized via Byrne's (1971) Interpersonal 
Judgment Scale; the latter was assessed via the newly developed
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Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, the measure of interpersonal 
uncertainty created as a function of Phase I.
Procedures
In order to address the hypothesized relationships among 
attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction, as well as 
to partially replicate the Sunnafrank (1983) study, the pro­
cedures were as similar to those of Sunnafrank's as was possi­
ble and appropriate. Because two experimenters of different 
genders aided the author in this study, experimenters were 
randomly assigned to dyads across all experimental sessions 
conducted within a given day. This decision was made in order 
to minimize any potential systematic error effects due to sex 
of the experimenter.
Upon arrival to the experimental session, Ss were checked 
in at a central location and were taken in pairs to their re­
spective "individual rooms," or the rooms that were designated 
for all tasks in which partners were asked to complete a task 
individually. In order to prevent interactions between part­
ners during each individual task, partitions were constructed 
and placed at both ends of a seminar table where each of the 
partners was asked to sit. Once Ss were seated behind their 
respective partitions, they were informed that they were en­
gaging in a project concerning friendship formation and were 
told that they would be completing several tasks based on 
varying amounts of information about their partners over time. 
This introduction and each of the remaining sets of instructions
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were tape recorded messages, recorded by a professional news­
caster in the local area. However, the experimenters were 
encouraged to answer any questions that might arise.
Following the initial introduction to the study, Ss were 
reminded of the attitude survey they had completed approxi­
mately one week earlier, were given a copy of that survey for 
verification purposes, and were told that they would be re­
ceiving a copy of the same attitude survey as it had been 
completed by another individual. Although Ss were not told 
that the attitude survey was that of the person behind the 
other partition, they were told that the first task involved 
reading the attitude survey of another individual, forming 
as complete a picture as possible of that individual based 
on his or her responses, and completing a questionnaire about 
that person based on the resulting impression. Subjects also 
were told that they would have the opportunity to meet and 
talk with that individual and, at a later point, would have 
the chance to exchange thoughts and ideas concerning the at­
titude items. Once all instructions for the first task were 
given, Ss were presented a copy of their own and a copy of 
another individual's attitude survey and were asked to verify 
their own respective attitude surveys. Upon completing this 
initial task, Ss were asked to study the responses of the 
other individual for approximately three minutes and to form 
as complete an impression about that person as possible. They 
were then asked to complete Booklet A, which included an
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attitude similarity manipulation check (i.e., the 3-item per­
ceived attitude similarity scale), the Interpersonal Uncer­
tainty Scale created in Phase I, and Byrne's Interpersonal 
Judgment Scale. As stated earlier, the perceived attitude 
similarity scale is provided in Appendix C. The Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale and Byrne's Interpersonal Judgment Scale are 
provided respectively in Appendixes E and F. As stated ear­
lier, all instructions were given on tape by a local radio 
newscaster, although the two experimenters who aided the au­
thor in all data collection procedures were encouraged to 
answer questions if necessary.
Once participants completed this initial experimental 
stage, they were escorted to a conference room to complete an 
initial conversation with their respective partners. Instruc­
tions, again, were given on tape for the second stage of the 
study, and asked that Ss take approximately five (5) minutes 
to get acquainted with one another. However, Ss were asked 
not to discuss their responses to the attitude survey and were 
reminded that they would have a chance to do so at a later 
point in time. All Ss' interactions were tape recorded in 
order to verify that instructions for the task were accurately 
followed. Following the provision of instructions on tape, 
the researcher removed the tape, replaced it with a blank cas­
sette, turned on both that and an additional recorder, asked 
that Ss state their social security numbers for later verifi­
cation of data, and left the room for five minutes so that Ss
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could converse. Upon completion of this interaction, Ss were 
escorted once again to their respective "individual rooms" 
and were asked to complete the perceived attitude similarity 
scale, the Interpersonal Judgment Scale and the Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale (Booklet B). In addition, they were re­
minded that they would have the opportunity to discuss the 
attitude survey at a later point in time.
Upon completion of the second stage of the study, Ss 
again were escorted to a conference room, but this time were 
asked to discuss only their responses to the attitude survey. 
Again, each pair of Ss was given five minutes to converse, 
and audiotapes were made to ensure that all Ss followed the 
instructions. Once the five-minute attitude discussions 
were completed, Ss again were escorted to their "individual 
rooms" and were asked to complete Booklet C, which contained 
the identical scales used in stages one and two of the ex­
periment. Subjects then were told that they would be de­
briefed once the experiment had been completed.
Manipulation Check
Like the manipulation check employed in Phase I of this 
study. Phase II likewise incorporated the three-item perceived 
attitude similarity scale, provided in Appendix C. Use of 
these three seven-point, Likert-type rating scales allowed 
the researcher to verify the success of the attitude similar­
ity manipulations. Unlike the previous method of scoring the 
attitude scales, however, the use of dyads in Phase II and a
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potential violation of the statistical independence assump­
tion required that a dyadic score be constructed for each 
pair of Ss. To construct this dyadic score, the sum of the 
individual composite scores was computed. Due to the un­
equal cell sizes and, hence, the unbalanced nature of the 
design, a univariate analysis of variance using harmonic 
(weighted) means and an .05 level of significance were then 
employed.
Statistical Analyses 
Once all initial dyadic scores were computed, the data 
were subjected to a 3 x 3 x 2 multivariate analysis of vari­
ance (MANOVA) for unequal cell frequencies and repeated mea­
sures on one factor. Due to the extremely small and unequal 
cell frequencies (see Table 3 for specific cell sizes), the 
analysis and interpretation of these data were approached 
with caution. First, the overall MANOVA was conducted using 
harmonic (i.e., weighted) means, as were the univariate 
ANOVAs which followed. Use of harmonic means allows the re­
searcher to take into account the potential consequences of 
an unbalanced design, particularly violations of the statis­
tical independence assumption. Second, all interpretations 
were made from within the narrow framework which an unbalanced 
design imposes. For example, although no significant inter­
actions were found in either the MANOVA or ANOVA results, 
the exploratory nature of this study led the experimenter to 
peruse cell means for possible patterns in the data. In
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TABLE 3
CELL FREQUENCIES FOR THE SEX OF DYAD X 
ATTITUDE SIMILARITY INTERACTION
Degree of Attitude Similarity
Sex of Dyad 100% Agree 50% Agree 0% Agree
Male 4 6 1
Female 5 6 4
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addition, selected comparisons were conducted on the data 
across levels of both attitude similarity and conversational 
stage, again in search of possible existing patterns.
Although multivariate analysis of variance was used as 
an initial screener, univariate analyses of variance were 
performed in order to test the four hypotheses, i.e., to as­
sess the potential effects of the independent variables on 
each of the dependent variables: interpersonal uncertainty
and attraction, respectively. As with all previous analyses, 
a significance level of .05 was required for a given ANOVA to 
reach significance.
Finally, should any significant interaction effects exist 
among the independent variables, the decision was made to 
test the four major hypotheses via the use of Tukey's studen- 
tized range test. This test allows for adequate protection 
against Type II error, while at the same time providing con­
servative tests of significance for each comparison. Again, 
the .05 level was established as the necessary level of 
significance. Should no interaction effects be found among 
the independent variables, the tests of the hypotheses would 
not be possible in this study. In this event, selected com­
parisons would be made in order to determine any patterns 
that might emerge in the data as a function of significant 
main effect differences. Again, Tukey's studentized range 
test and the .05 level of significance were selected.
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Summary
To this point, I have presented a rationale and litera­
ture review which argued the value of the study conducted.
In addition, I have described the means by which the research 
question and hypotheses were addressed. In Chapter III of 
this thesis, the discussion will turn to the results and dis­




Previous chapters of this thesis have provided the ra­
tionale and methods for this investigation. The purpose of 
the current chapter is to present and interpret the results. 
First, information resulting from Phase I of the study will 
be presented in order to address Research Questions One and 
Two. Second, information provided by Phase II will be pre­
sented and discussed in an effort to address Research Ques­
tions Three and Four. Finally, data will be presented which 
further address the validity issue raised in Research Ques­
tion Two in order to establish further support for Phase I 
results.
Phase I; Results
By What Vehicle May the Construct of 
Uncertainty Best Be Understood?
In order to address Research Question One, a sixty-five 
item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale was constructed. This 
instrument was designed on the basis of a review of the un­
certainty literature and focused on three dimensions of inter­
personal uncertainty in initial interactions. These dimensions
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included one's general ability to predict, explain and influ­
ence other's goals, values, attitudes, beliefs, behavior, 
etc.
Although the decision was made initially to utilize a 
principle components analysis with varimax rotation to analyze 
the data generated in Phase I, the varimax rotation became un­
necessary because, as soon will be noted, only one factor was 
viable given the criteria for selection of the factors. Over­
all, twelve (12) factors initially emerged from an analysis of 
the sixty-five item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. Of those 
twelve factors, however, only one factor produced loadings 
pure enough to support its inclusion in a resulting uncertainty 
instrument. Support for a one-factor solution also can be 
seen in the results of the Scree Test (See Appendix G, Table 
1 for these results), the use of a .60 - .40 purity index, 
and a five-item loading requirement on any factor generated.
The items and their respective loadings on Factor 1 are pre­
sented in Table 4. Those items which did not load are pre­
sented in Table 2 of Appendix G, along with the distribution 
of their factor loadings. The ten items which loaded on Fac­
tor 1 accounted for 26.1% of the common variance.
Although the majority of the sixty-five items comprising 
the original uncertainty measure were generated through a re­
view of the uncertainty literature, seven of the items were 
adapted from Clatterbuck's (1979) CL7, a seven-item measure 
of "proactive attributional confidence." This decision was
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TABLE 4
FACTOR ONE OF THE INTERPERSONAL UNCERTAINTY SCALE-65
FACTOR 1: Interpersonal Uncertainty FI
9. I am doubtful of my general ability to 
predict how would behave. .60 .54
20. I feel sure that I could predict the 
common goals that and I would have 
in a personal relationship. .60 .69
24. I feel uncertain about predicting how 
would respond in most informal 
settings. .60 .56
25. In most instances, I feel doubtful that 
I could explain 's personal values. .60 .58
27. In most cases, I feel certain that I 
could explain 's personal attitudes. .61 .53
29. In general, I am confident that I 
could predict the costs involved in a 
relationship with .61 .68
44. Generally, I feel confident that I 
could explain why would say to 
me the things that s/he would say. .63 .64
48. In general, I feel confident that I 
could explain the rewards that would 
exist in our relationship. .64 .64
49. I feel sure that I could explain 
's personal preferences. .67 .63
59. In general, I feel sure that I could 
explain the costs that would exist 





Cum % of Variance 26.1
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made on the basis of the frequency with which the latter 
scale has been used to tap "uncertainty" in the literature, 
and acted as one means of assessing the potential correlation 
existing between the scales. In addition, its inclusion 
could provide potential insights concerning the validity and 
reliability of both uncertainty scales (i.e., the CL7 and 
the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale). Interestingly enough, 
the results revealed that only one of the Clatterbuck items
loaded purely on any given factor. This item loaded on Factor
1 and therefore was adapted for inclusion in the resulting 
10-item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, the uncertainty in­
strument which was utilized in Phase II of this study. The 
seven items of the CL7 and their respective factor loadings 
are presented in Table 5.
Can a Valid and Reliable "Self-Report"
Measure of Uncertainty Be Constructed
as a Function of its Current 
Conceptualization in the 
Literature?
In order to establish the validity and reliability of 
the ten-item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, several indexes 
of these concepts were employed. First, factor loadings were 
perused as an indicator of the reliability of the resulting 
scale (Guilford, 1954, p. 399), while communality estimates 
(i.e., h-squares) were used as an index of the validity of 
the principle components analysis (Harman, 1976) . These
TABLE 5
FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE CL7-ATTRIBUTIONAL CONFIDENCE SCALE»*
Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll F12
9. I am doubtful of my general ability to 
predict how would behave.» .60 -.31 .16 .09 .07 .15 -.01 .11 -.05 .10 .02 -.04 .54
51. I feel certain that would like
.43 .32 -.08 .21 .35 -.17 -.001 -.16 -.15 .07 -.06 .06 .54
1. Generally, I feel uncertain that I 
could predict the personal values that 
holds. .33 -.28 .22 .03 -.09 .27 -.19 -.04 -.17 .12 — .06 -.24 .46
15. I feel that I could accurately predict 
•s personal attitudes. .60 .41 -.15 .14 -.02 .09 -.02 .05 .06 -.02 -.09 -.13 .61
16. I would feel uncertain about predicting 
's feelings and emotions. .52 -.35 .11 .22 .03 .03 -.23 .10 .09 -.04 .08 .07 .54
19. I could empathize with (share) the way 
feels about himself/herself. .37 .23 -.09 -.08 .44 .24 -.12 .14 .15 .16 -.15 -.14 .57
10. I feel that I know well. .40 -.32 -.27 .30 .09 -.01 .15 -.10 .03 .19 .11 -.11 .53
to
'Items Loading on Factor 1 of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale.
**Items are presented in the order in which they were delineated by Clatterbuck (1979),
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indexes provided one estimate of the validity and reliability 
of the factor structure. Second, analyses of variance, mul­
tiple classification analyses, and/or Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients were calculated for interpersonal 
uncertainty (i.e., the ten-item instrument) and such varia­
bles as university, age, year, gender and level of attitude 
similarity (0, 50, and 100% agreement). This decision was 
made in order to assess the potential contribution of addi­
tional variables to the amount of variance explained by the 
interpersonal uncertainty construct. Third, an estimate of 
the internal reliability of the newly developed instrument 
was determined via the use of Cronbach's alpha coefficient.
A coefficient of .80 or greater was required for the coeffi­
cient to be considered meaningful. Finally, the scale was 
utilized in an experimental setting to test several key as­
sumptions in the uncertainty literature —  primarily, the 
hypothesized relationships among attitude similarity, uncer­
tainty and attraction. It was reasoned that if significant 
differences could be found in Ss' perceived level of uncer­
tainty and if the cell means were in the predicted direction, 
one direct test of the instrument's construct validity might 
be said to have been conducted. Results of indexes one, two 
and three will be reported at the present time. Results of 
the experimental study will be reported under "Phase II" of 
this study.
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In perusing the factor loadings and communality esti­
mates for Factor One, the only "pure" factor emerging from 
this study, results revealed the existence of a range of .60 
to .67 for factor loadings and a range of .54 to .69 for 
communality estimates (See Table 4). These ranges suggest 
the existence of moderate validity and internal reliability 
for the scale, when all other items (i.e., the remaining 55) 
have been included in the analysis.
A second index of the validity of the ten-item scale 
which was utilized in this study was the calculation of sev­
eral pertinent analyses of variance, multiple classification 
analyses and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
These calculations were made on the relationships among in­
terpersonal uncertainty and such variables as university, sex, 
age, year in school and degree of attitude similarity. The 
latter variable was manipulated through the use of a bogus 
stranger technique. Results of these analyses revealed the 
existence of no significant relationships among these varia­
bles and interpersonal uncertainty. For example, the comple­
tion of a random sample of Ss from each university used in 
this study and the use of analysis of variance revealed the 
existence of no significant differences in uncertainty as a 
function of university (F(2,116) = 2.29, p = .11, = .007
for the 65-item scale; F(2,112) = 2.38, p = .10, = .008
for the 10-item scale, respectively). For this analysis, a 
random sample was used in order to achieve equal cell sizes.
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Of even greater use, however, multiple classification analy­
sis revealed that "university" accounted for only 3.8% of 
the total variance.
Additionally, analyses of variance revealed the exis­
tence of no significant difference for attitude similarity 
(F(3,565) = .685, p = .56), although a sex difference was 
found (F(1,567) = 9.74, p = .01). However, multiple classi­
fication analysis revealed that very little variance in un-
2
certainty was accounted for by either variable (R = .004,
2
R = .017, respectively).
Finally, in this second set of analyses, Pearson product- 
moment correlation coefficients were calculated in order to 
determine the amount of variance in uncertainty accounted for 
by age and year in school. Results of these calculations
2
also revealed weak and nonsignificant results: for year, r
2
= .002; for age, r = .009. Overall, this set of analyses 
revealed that, of those variables utilized, none contributed 
significantly to the amount of variance explained concerning 
the uncertainty construct.
Third, an estimate of the internal reliability of the 
newly developed uncertainty scale was made via the use of 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient. Results of this computation 
yielded an alpha of .863.
Manipulation Check. In order to determine the success 
of the attitude similarity manipulation in Phase I, data 
generated by Attitude Survey 3, the same measure of perceived
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attitude similarity employed in Phase I, were analyzed in the
forms of both individual and summated scores. Results of
these analyses revealed that subjects perceived themselves to
differ in attitude similarity both when perceived similarity
2
scores were summed (F(3,566) = 231.76, p = .01, R = .55) and 
when similarity items were treated individually (perceived at­
titude similarity: F(3,566) = 273.34, p = .01, R^ = .59);
perceived value similarity: F(3,566) = 139.43, p = .001, R^
= .425; perceived overall similarity: F (3,566) = 97.11, p =
2
.001, R = .34, respectively). In addition, when cell means 
were examined, significant differences were found to exist 
for all comparisons, using Tukey's procedure for harmonic 
means; harmonic means were used due to the existence of un­
equal cell sizes. As a function of the very large cell- 
sizes, however, the decision was made to informally assess 
the means to determine the observed differences which existed 
in the sample between the two possible 50% agree levels of 
attitude similarity. As Table 6 on the following page reveals, 
very little difference seemed to exist. For this reason, the 
decision was made to collapse the two 50% levels when conduct­
ing Phase II of this study.
Phase I: Discussion
In reviewing the results which emerged from the comple­
tion of Phase I of this study, three major conclusions about 
this phase may be drawn. First, the Interpersonal Uncertainty 
Scale as the instrument presently is operationalized represents
TABLE 6
MEANS OF PERCEIVED ATTITUDE SIMILARITY 
MANIPULATION CHECK
Degree and Direction of Attitude Responses
(Agree-Agree) (Agree-Disagree) (Disagree-Agree) (Disagree-Disagree)
16.10 12.06 11.17 7.49
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a seemingly viable means of addressing the uncertainty con­
cept. Second, the results provide some supporting evidence 
for the existence of both validity and reliability regarding 
the scale, properties of the measure which establish its 
viability. Finally, the data generated by the principle com­
ponents analysis employed provide additional support for cur­
rent conceptualizations of uncertainty in the literature.
This conclusion is particularly salient for that literature 
which addresses the constructs of "prediction" and "explana­
tion" as they relate to the concept of interpersonal uncer­
tainty.
Although these conclusions legitimately can be drawn from 
the results which emerged from Phase I, three interesting re­
sults also emerged for this researcher which address the pres­
ent operationalization. First, a discrepancy exists concern­
ing the degree of "fit" between the Interpersonal Uncertainty 
Scale and the literature which addresses the importance of 
"influence" or "control" in uncertainty reduction. Second, 
the inclusion of the CL7 and its "poor showing" in the factor 
analysis suggests the existence of problems regarding 
Clatterbuck's scale. In turn, its almost exclusive use in 
the uncertainty literature calls into question much of the 
research which focuses on uncertainty. Finally, limitations 
may have arisen from the use of the principle components 
analysis itself which have implications for the interpretation 
of results in the present study. Following an address of each
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of the major conclusions which have been delineated, the 
discussion will turn to an address of these three concerns.
As stated in Chapter One of this study, one goal of the 
present research was to construct a viable measure of inter­
personal uncertainty. This goal was established on the basis 
of the existence of no valid and reliable index in the pres­
ent uncertainty literature and, as a result, provided the 
major impetus for the present research. In turning to the 
study which emerged from this goal, results of Phase I seem 
to indicate that the goal partially was achieved —  more 
specifically, that a viable measure of interpersonal uncer­
tainty has been constructed. As stated earlier, results of 
the principle components analysis revealed the existence of 
moderate validity and reliability for the factor structure, 
particularly as indicated by the respective strength of the 
factor loadings and communality estimates. Additionally, 
alternative measures of the validity and reliability of the 
newly developed instrument support an argument for the via­
bility of the scale.
Second, and related to the aforementioned conclusion, 
the ten-item uncertainty scale seems to represent a valid and 
reliable index of the uncertainty construct, particularly 
given the number and variety of validity/reliability indexes 
used. Supporting evidence for this statement includes not 
only the results of the factor analysis (i.e., factor load­
ings and communality estimates), but also the fact that so
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little variance was accounted for by other potentially con­
founding variables used in the study (e.g., levels of uni­
versity, age, year in school, degree, sex, attitude similar­
ity, etc.). Additionally, the internal consistency of the 
instrument was exceptionally high (alpha = .86) , a fact 
which suggests further evidence of the instrument's reliabil­
ity.
Finally, a third conclusion which may be drawn from the 
previous results is that the content of those items which 
loaded on Factor 1 seem to support much of the literature 
concerning the nature of uncertainty. This conclusion es­
pecially holds for the proposed relationship between predic­
tion and explanation, particularly as that relationship has 
been articulated by Berger (1975). In essence, that almost 
an equal number of both items loaded purely on the first 
principle component supports the strong correlation predicted 
to exist between the two constructs. Additionally, the mea­
sure of internal consistency computed for the Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale supports this conclusion.
Although the results reported in Phase I partially sup­
port the viability of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale, 
three questions also emerged from Phase I of this study re­
garding the scale and its relationship to current conceptuali­
zations of uncertainty existing in the literature. First, if 
this index is indeed a viable representation of the interper­
sonal uncertainty concept, that literature is called into
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question which currently addresses the importance of "influ­
ence" or "control" in the uncertainty reduction process.
Indeed, as results of the current investigation revealed, no
items generated to tap this alleged dimension loaded purely 
on any factor (Again, see Table 2 in Appendix G for a delinea­
tion of those items not loading). This finding conflicts with
statements in the literature that "perceived influence" plays 
a role in initial interactions, and that "perceived control" 
must be increased in order to reduce interpersonal uncertainty 
(Berger and Bradac, 1982).
Second, if this index is a valid and reliable index 
which accurately assesses interpersonal uncertainty, failure 
of the items adapted from Clatterbuck's CL7 to purely load 
calls into question the "validity" and "reliability" of the 
CL7. Given almost an exclusive use of this instrument by 
Berger and his associates, in turn much of the research con­
cerning uncertainty may be called into question. If, in fact, 
such questions may be raised concerning the CL7 and its con­
struct validity, any research which solely has relied on the 
instrument to tap uncertainty may have hampered the overall 
theory building process. At the very least a positive re­
sponse to this question could partially explain the existence 
of inconsistent and contradictory findings in the uncertainty 
literature.
Finally, the selection of a principle components analysis 
rather than an alternative method of factor selection may have
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produced problematic results. As stated in the results sec­
tion above, only 10 of 65 items loaded purely on the factor 
structure. In addition, Factor 1 of the Interpersonal Un­
certainty Scale accounted for only 26.1% of the variance. 
Although principle components analyses provided a highly 
parsimonious solution (as the procedure is designed to do), 
it may have completed its task at the expense of possible 
systematic error in the reproduction of the intercorrelations. 
As Harris (1975) has noted, this problem is a possibility 
"since there may be one or two variables so much more highly 
related to the 'missing' principle components than to those 
included as to make our estimates of the intercorrelaticns of 
other variables with these one or two highly dependent on the 
omitted data" (p. 25). Given that so little variance was ac­
counted for and that so few of the items loaded purely, such 
a problem in actuality may have occurred.
Phase II; Results 
Phase II of this project was designed to address Research 
Questions Three and Four, as well as to provide additional 
supporting evidence for the construct validity of the Inter­
personal Uncertainty Scale, constructed and partially vali­
dated during Phase I. The primary means of analyzing the data 
for Phase II included multivariate and univariate analyses and 
the use of selected individual comparisons. It is to the re­
sults of these analyses that the discussion now turns.
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Are Key Studies that Have Been Conducted Replicable,
Given the Use of Appropriate and Correctly 
Employed Statistical Procedures?
In order to address the third research question, a par­
tial replication of Sunnafrank's (1983) study was completed. 
This replication was designed to correct for violations of 
the statistical independence assumption and to test 
Sunnafrank's (1983) hypotheses in a repeated measures frame­
work. Specifically, Hypotheses lA and IB were delineated as 
follows :
Hypothesis lA: Individuals who are aware that they
are paired with an attitudinally 
dissimilar partner will be less 
attracted to their partners prior 
to conversing with them than after 
a normal initial conversation and 
after this type of conversation 
followed by an attitude discussion 
(Sunnafrank, 1983, p. 278).
Hypothesis IB: . . .  attitudinally similar part­
ners will be more attracted to one 
another than attitudinally dissim­
ilar partners only prior to con­
versing with them (p. 278).
Although an overall multivariate analysis of variance was 
used as an initial screener, results of the univariate analyses 
of variance were perused in order to determine the significance 
of the overall attitude similarity X conversational stage in­
teraction. Such a significant interaction would have to exist 
before appropriate tests of the hypotheses could be completed 
through individual comparison procedures. Results of the 
overall univariate ANOVA for attraction revealed the existence
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of no significant sex of dyad X attitude similarity X conver­
sational stage interaction (F(4,40) = 2.12, p = .10) as well 
as no significant interaction between attitude similarity 
and conversational stage, (F(4,40) = 0.68, p = .61). Addi­
tionally, the sex of dyad X conversational stage interaction 
was found to be nonsignificant (F(2,40) = 0.35, p = .71).
As a result of the overall nonsignificant interactions which 
were found to exist in these data, no further statistical 
tests or procedures were deemed appropriate. Consequently, 
no tests of the hypotheses could be completed.
Given a Positive Response to These Specific (Three) 
Questions, Can Uncertainty Be Considered for 
Candidacy as a Mediating Variable between 
Attitude Similarity and Attraction?
Much as the results produced by the univariate ANOVA for 
interpersonal attraction did not allow for tests of Hypotheses 
lA and IB, in the same way ANOVA results prevented the test­
ing of Hypotheses 2A and 2B:
Hypothesis 2A: Individuals who are aware that they
are paired with an attitudinally 
dissimilar partner will feel less 
certain of their ability to predict, 
explain and influence their part­
ner's behavior (etc.) prior to 
conversing with them than after a 
normal initial conversation and 
after this type of conversation 
followed by an attitude discussion.
Hypothesis 2B: Attitudinally similar partners will
feel more certain than attitudinally 
dissimilar partners only prior to 
conversing with them.
8 5
Like Hypotheses lA and IB, 2A and 2B were based on an assumed 
interaction between attitude similarity and conversational 
stage —  an interaction effect not found to exist by the 
analysis of variance for interpersonal uncertainty performed 
(F(4,40) = 0.20, p = .93). Given the impossibility of directly 
testing the hypothesized relationships in Hypotheses 2A and 
2B, the decision was made to turn to additional data analyses. 
This decision was made in order to address the existence of 
possible patterns in the uncertainty and attraction data and, 
hence, to further assess the potential construct validity of 
the ten-item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale.
Construct Validity and the Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale 
Although the assumed interaction between attitude simil­
arity and conversational stage was found to be nonsignificant 
for both uncertainty and attraction and, hence, prevented 
further tests of the proposed hypotheses, additional analyses 
performed on both sets of data revealed the existence of sig­
nificant findings as well as several interesting patterns. 
Because these analyses provided further support for the con­
struct validity of the uncertainty scale, the decision was 
made to report the results at this time.
In order to determine the existence of potential main ef­
fects by the independent variables on perceived attitude sim­
ilarity, uncertainty and attraction, again multivariate 
analyses of variance were performed. Using the .05 level of
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significance, results of these analyses revealed the existence
of a significant main effect for conversational stage (F(6,76)
2
= 9.03, p = .0001, w = .077) as well as a significant main 
effect for attitude similarity which approached significance 
(F(6,36) = 2.25, p = .06). Based on these findings and due to 
the exploratory nature of this study, selected univariate analy­
ses of variance were performed. Results of these analyses re­
vealed the existence of a significant effect by conversational
stage on interpersonal uncertainty (F(2,40) = 32.66, p = .0001,
2
w = 0.33), although no such effect was found for level of at­
titude similarity (F(2,20) = 2.00, p = .16). Additionally, a 
significant difference was found for interpersonal attraction
as a function of conversational stage (F(2,40) = 5.14, p = .01,
2
CO = 0.06). More specific results concerning the overall multi­
variate analyses are reported in Table 1 of Appendix H. Re­
sults of the univariate analyses are presented more completely 
in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix I.
Given the existence of significant effects by conversa­
tional stage on interpersonal uncertainty, the decision was 
made to perform selected individual comparisons on uncertainty 
means, again collapsing across the three levels of attitude 
similarity. This decision was made in order to determine the 
directionality of the means and, hence, to further establish 
the validity of the uncertainty measure. Results of the Tukey's 
studentized range procedure revealed the existence of signifi­
cant differences at the .05 level for all comparisons of
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interpersonal uncertainty. Table 7 presents the results of 
all comparisons that were completed.
Finally, the cell means themselves were perused across lev­
els of similarity and conversational stage in order to determine 
the nature of possible trends existing in the data. Results of 
this perusal revealed that interpersonal uncertainty decreased 
across all levels of conversational stage at each level of at­
titude similarity as well as across all levels of attitude sim­
ilarity (moving from 0 to 100% similar) at each level of con­
versational stage. (Cell and marginal means for interpersonal 
uncertainty as a function of the degree of similarity X conver­
sational stage analysis are presented in Table 8). However, 
very few perceptible changes took place in attraction scores 
across levels of attitude similarity and conversational stage, 
despite the existence of significant F-values. Cell and mar­
ginal means for interpersonal attraction are reported in Table 9.
Manipulation check. The final set of statistical analyses 
which were employed addressed the degree of success achieved in 
manipulating levels of attitude similarity. Again, the levels 
attempted were 0, 50 and 100% similarity. Although the manipu­
lation check employed during Phase I of this study revealed a 
successful manipulation, the same manipulation check employed 
in Phase II revealed only partial success. This check was com­
pleted through the use of the three-item Perceived Attitude Sim­
ilarity Scale constructed in Phase I, the use of summated scores 
for each of the dyads, univariate analysis of variance and se­
lected individual comparisons (again, Tukey's studentized
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TABLE 7
COMPARISONS MADE REGARDING INTERPERSONAL 







at the .05 Level
1-2 7.692 * * *
1-3 14.808 ***
2-3 7.115 * * *
TABLE 8
MEANS FOR THE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY X CONVERSATIONAL









100% Similar 82.2 73.4 66.3 74.0
n=9 n=9 n=9
50% Similar 88.6 80.4 74.2 81.1
n=12 n=12 n=12
0% Similar 89.4 84.8 75.6 83.3
n=5 n=5 n=5





MEANS FOR THE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY X CONVERSATIONAL









100% Similar 22.7 23.1 23.9 23.2
n=9 n=9 n=9
50% Similar 21.1 22.7 22.8 22.2
n=12 n=12 n=12
0% Similar 21.6 21.8 23.2 22.2
n=5 n=5 n=5





range test was employed). Despite the fact that an overall
ANOVA revealed the existence of a significant main effect for
level of attitude similarity (F(2,20) = 4.86, p = .02, = 0.10)
as well as for conversational stage (F(2,40) = 10.67, p = .0002,
2
w = 0.13), results of the Tukey's studentized range procedure 
revealed that only the 0% and 100% levels of attitude similar­
ity differed significantly (p < .05). No other levels of atti­
tude similarity were found to be significantly different.
Means for the perceived attitude similarity check are reported 
in Table 10. More complete results concerning the analysis of 
variance for perceived similarity are presented in Table 3 of 
Appendix I .
Phase II: Discussion
In turning to a discussion of the results which emerged 
from Phase II, one potential interpretation of these findings 
is that the results do not confirm previous attraction research. 
More specifically, they call into question the replicability of 
previous findings concerning attitude similarity, the primary 
issue addressed by Research Question Three. Such an interpre­
tation would be particularly salient for studies produced by 
Sunnafrank (1983) and Sunnafrank and Miller (1981) , if in fact 
such an explanation could be documented and supported.
Although this interpretation ultimately may act as the 
most plausible explanation, several problems that emerged dur­
ing the course of the present study suggest the viability of 
an alternative interpretation: namely, the validity problem
TABLE 10
MEANS FOR THE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY X CONVERSATIONAL









100% Similar 29.3 30.0 32.4 30.6
n=9 n=9 n=9
50% Similar 26.3 27.8 27.9 27.3
n=12 n=12 n=12
0% Similar 20.8 23.8 27.2 23.9
n=5 n=5 n=5





inherent in the present study may have prevented the re­
searcher from adequately addressing the research questions 
and consequently from supporting the viability of Interpre­
tation One. For example, two particular threats to the 
validity of this study were low sample sizes and unequal 
cell frequencies. These problems potentially challenged the 
statistical conclusion validity of the study. Second, the 
mortality rate for the study was of particular significance 
and may have posed a threat to the internal validity of the 
study. Additionally, the study's internal validity may have 
been affected by a testing effect due to the nature of the 
repeated factor, conversational stage. Third, the partial 
failure of the attitude similarity manipulation reveals the 
existence of a potential problem concerning the study's con­
struct validity. Finally, the time of year during which the 
study was conducted (i.e.. Summer term) and the setting for 
the experiment may have challenged the study's external 
validity and, in fact, may have created the conditions from 
which the previous problems emerged. Indeed, supporting evi­
dence seems to document their negative impact on the overall 
study.
Given the potential contribution of each of these prob­
lems to the overall validity of the research and, hence, as 
supporting evidence for the viability of the second interpre­
tation, the decision was made to employ validity issues as 
the framework through which a documentation of Interpretation
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Two would proceed. The discussion begins with an address of 
potential threats to the study's statistical conclusion vali­
dity.
Statistical Conclusion Validity 
According to Cook and Campbell (1979), statistical con­
clusion validity is concerned with sources of random error 
and the appropriate use of statistics and statistical tests. 
More specifically, this form of validity is associated with 
inferences about "whether it is reasonable to presume [the 
existence of] covariation between the independent and depend­
ent variables" (pp. 40-41). The particular question that is 
asked regarding statistical conclusion validity is : are the
presumed independent and dependent variables related?
In delineating potential threats to statistical conclu­
sion validity. Cook and Campbell focus on the existence of 
at least seven major threats. Of particular salience to 
the present study are (1) lower statistical power due to low 
sample sizes and (2) violated assumptions of statistical tests. 
For the purposes of the present study, "power" is defined as 
the ability to reject a null hypothesis, given some true mean, 
or the ability to detect certain deviations from the null 
means if the deviations exist (Toothaker, 1974). The assump­
tions in question for this particular study are the normality 
and homoscedasticity (i.e., equal variance) assumptions.
As stated in Chapter II of this study, which reported 
the overall sample size of the investigation, 52 subjects
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actually participated in the data collection procedures in­
corporated in Phase II. When translated into actual amount 
of dyadic data generated, only 26 scores were utilized in this 
study. Such a sample size is exceptionally low for a 3 x 3 x
2 design, despite the fact that one of the factors was opera­
tionalized as a repeated factor. As a result of utilizing 
such a low sample size, the statistical power of the study was 
lowered and the likelihood of making an incorrect no-differ­
ence conclusion was increased (i.e., the probability of a Type 
II error increased). The reason for such a decrease in power 
is that the variance of the mean inflates as N decreases and 
pushes more of the distribution outside the rejection region 
(given the mean score under the null) (Toothaker, 1974, p.
24). Thus, when N decreases, statistical power also decreases. 
In this instance, the result is a greater chance of falsely 
accepting a no-difference hypothesis.
A second problem which existed as a function of the sam­
ple size employed in the present study was an inability on the 
part of the researcher to test for possible violations of sta­
tistical assumptions. Of particular interest would have been 
the normality and homoscedasticity (i.e., equal variance) as­
sumptions, given the low and unequal frequencies of participat­
ing Ss across levels of sex and attitude similarity (See Table
3 in Chapter II for the exact sex of dyad X attitude similarity 
cell frequencies). Because Ss were so unevenly distributed 
across cells and were distributed with such low frequencies
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(as a function of Ss who actually participated in the experi­
ment) , a greater chance exists that the F-tests which were 
calculated were not robust to potential violations of assump­
tions. Should the latter result have occurred, the alpha 
level which was set for the experiment (i.e., alpha-set =
.05) may have been inappropriate to the conditions of the ex­
periment (i.e., alpha-set would not have been equal to alpha- 
true) . As a result of potential violations of the homosce­
dasticity assumption, the F-test would have been liberal or 
conservative, depending on the pattern of relationships be­
tween the n's and the variances. Should the normality assump­
tion be violated, the degree of conservatism or liberalism dis­
played by the F-test would have depended on the shape of the 
sampling distribution of X.
Although the normality and homoscedasticity assumptions, 
in fact, may not have been violated in this study (again, the 
low sample size prevented the testing of these assumptions), 
one assumption which may have been violated is the sphericity 
assumption, which assumes that, "for all possible levels of 
the fixed variable [in this case attitude similarity], the 
variance of the difference between pairs of scores across all 
levels of the random effect [conversational stage] must be 
constant" (Toothaker, 1974, p. 80). Because both the general 
sphericity assumption and its more specific case, compound 
symmetry, are more than likely not met in practical settings
7
such as the repeated measures design (Toothaker, 1982) and
9 7
because the F-test is not robust to violations of the 
sphericity assumption, all F-tests generated in this study 
may have been too liberal (i.e., alpha-true would have been 
greater than alpha-set). As a result, the probability of 
Type I error may have increased in all cases where signifi­
cant differences were declared.
Internal Validity 
Related to statistical conclusion validity which ad­
dresses whether covariation between the independent and de­
pendent variables actually exists, internal validity focuses 
on "the validity with which statements can be made about 
whether there is a causal relationship from one variable to 
another in the form in which the variables were manipulated 
or measured" (Cook and Campbell, 1979, pp. 40-41). Two var­
iables which may have called into question the internal vali­
dity of the present study are the high mortality rate and a 
potential testing effect due to the number of times the de­
pendent measures were completed across time. In turn, the 
former may have acted to cause a third threat to the internal 
validity of the study: more specifically, a "selection" ef­
fect, or an effect due to possible differences between the 
kinds of people who participated in each experimental group. 
Because the existence of the first and third threats became 
obvious to the researcher during data collection, and because 
the second was described as a "problem" by Ss in the debrief­
ing, the decision was made to report them as potential threats
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at this time. The form and implications of each will be 
documented in the following paragraphs.
As stated in the previous section, only 52 subjects par­
ticipated in Phase II. As a result only 26 dyadic scores in 
total were employed. Although this sample size (N = 26), in­
deed, is quite low, it becomes even more problematic when 
placed in the context of the overall mortality rate. When 
the study began, 148 Ss had completed the initial attitude 
survey and had been assigned to different levels of the sex 
of dyad X attitude similarity conditions. Upon completion, 
however, the study had produced close to a 70% mortality rate 
for dyads. Again, this figure should be placed in the proper 
context; a dyad was counted as "lost" if one or both persons 
did not arrive at the experimental session. In this instance, 
Ss were given the option of either being rescheduled and 
paired with a partner at a later time, or completing an indi­
vidual task, the 65-item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale em­
ployed in Phase I. The resulting data were used to aid in 
assessing the reliability of the resulting 10-item measure of 
interpersonal uncertainty across universities.
As a result of the high mortality rate, random assign­
ment to conditions was lost, as was the closely associated 
assurance that probabilistically equivalent groups received 
the treatments. More specifically, the possibility may have 
arisen that any significant F-tests which emerged in the pre­
vious results may have been due to differences between the
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kinds of people in one experimental condition as opposed to 
another. The highly unequal cell frequencies suggest the 
existence of this possibility, given the paucity of males in 
the completely disagree condition. However, a second and re­
lated selection problem may have emerged as well: the possi­
bility that the nonorthogonal design which "emerged" accur­
ately depicted the distribution of attitude similarity 
responses to the two attitude items in the "real world." If 
this situation in fact occurred, orthogonality may have been 
forced on a design that should have been treated as nonortho­
gonal initially, particularly as a function of the decision 
to "force" equal cell sizes whenever possible. As a result, 
the F-ratios and their respective degrees of significance 
again may have become questionable.
A third possible threat to the internal validity of 
Phase II in this study may have been the existence of a test­
ing effect, or an effect due to the number of times that in­
terpersonal uncertainty and attraction were measured. Because 
Ss were asked to complete the same booklet at three different 
intervals during the experiment, and because they were asked 
to do so within seven to ten minutes of their last completion, 
Ss may have attempted a form of "hypothesis guessing" or may 
have felt the need to be consistent in responding to the re­
spective booklet items. Although the researcher considered 
this effect as a possible effect initially, the nature of the 
repeated measures design rendered very few alternatives.
1 0 0
However, upon completion of the data collection stage, Ss con­
firmed the existence of a "testing" effect during the course 
of the debriefing. For example, one subject specifically 
stated that he deliberately refrained from using extreme scores 
when completing the scales across conversational stages. The 
reason he gave for his behavior was that he was unsure about 
whether both partners would exchange responses at some point 
during the experiment. As a result of this fear, he made the 
decision to limit the extremity of his responses. This admis­
sion alone may shed some light on the few differences existing 
across conversational stage for interpersonal attraction. At 
the very least, it suggests the possibility of a testing effect.
Construct Validity 
Much as statistical conclusion validity and internal va­
lidity are related as a function of the questions which they 
ask, so construct validity and external validity concerning a 
given piece of research are inextricably bound. While construct 
validity refers to "the approximate validity with which we can 
make generalizations about higher order constructs from re­
search," external validity addresses the researcher's ability 
to generalize to particular target persons, settings and times 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, p. 38; p. 71). Thus, questions of 
construct validity ask, "Can I generalize from this one oper­
ation or set of operations to a referent construct?" External 
validity asks whether I can generalize to and across popula­
tions, settings and times.
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In turning to the construct validity of the current 
study and specific threats which may have affected the re­
sults, at least one major problem emerged during the course 
of the study which may have produced nonsignificant findings. 
The manipulation of attitude similarity was not completely 
successful, as indicated by the use of the three-item per­
ceived attitude similarity check. Although the overall analy­
sis of variance revealed the existence of a significant effect 
for attitude similarity (F(2,20) = 4.86, p = .02, w^ = 0.10), 
results of the studentized range procedures revealed that only 
the 0% and 100% levels of attitude similarity differed signi­
ficantly. Consequently, the fit between the operations and 
conceptual definition of "attitude similarity" was less than 
optimal and, as a result, may have prevented the possibility 
of detecting the hypothesized attitude similarity X conversa­
tional stage interaction.
In turning to possible reasons for the partial failure 
of the similarity manipulation, perhaps the most compelling 
arguments emerged during the debriefing session with Ss. First 
Ss stated that the items themselves were "vaguely worded" and, 
as a result, caused insecurity regarding how Ss responded on 
the dichotomous scale (See Appendix A for a review of the at­
titude survey employed). Consequently, upon conversing with 
their partners, several of the subjects found that they were 
much more similar to their partners than they initially had 
believed. Second, Ss stated that generally they knew very
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little about nuclear energy, although they believed the abor­
tion item to be highly salient. Such a difference in the 
salience of the items also may have caused the attitude man­
ipulation to fail, particularly when coupled with Ss' percep­
tions that the items were "vaguely worded." Finally, Ss 
stated that two items alone provided too little information 
to allow a determination concerning similarity between them­
selves and their partners —  again, a potential reason for 
only partial success in manipulating attitude similarity. 
Although this latter statement has some validity in light of 
current attitudinal research (e.g., Kaplan, 1981), the deci­
sion was made to employ only two items in order to replicate 
the Sunnafrank research as closely as possible. Indeed, any 
one of these problems could have caused the attitude similar­
ity manipulation to fail, and hence, may have contributed to 
the creation of a nonsignificant attitude similarity X con­
versational stage interaction.
External Validity 
Although it is generally appropriate to reserve a dis­
cussion of external validity for the conclusions or "final 
chapter" of a respective paper (more will be said about the 
external validity of the study in Chapter IV), two specific 
threats to the external validity of the current study may have 
impacted on the results themselves and, consequently, may have 
contributed to the nonsignificance of the findings. It is 
for this reason that a decision was made to address these
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potential threats at this time. The problems in question 
are the time of year during which the study was conducted 
and the experimental setting which was selected. Each of 
these problems will be explicated in the following para­
graphs.
Perhaps the most threatening problem which existed for 
this study and which may have affected the validity of Phase 
II was the fact that the collection of data was conducted 
during the Summer term. Although this situation ideally 
should have produced little negative impact when considered 
alone, two different sets of evidence argue to the contrary. 
First, Ss themselves admitted during the debriefing that 
time of year was a factor in their decision to avoid parti­
cipation even though they initially had agreed to take part 
in the study. This factor, when combined with the fact that 
the study was conducted at the beginning of the term (a time 
when extra points were less important), was cited as a number 
one reason for non-participation. The overall result of this 
timing factor was a serious loss of dyads, a loss of strict 
randomization and the subsequent loss of equality of cell fre­
quencies in the design. Consequently, the chance that the 
author's data became serially correlated possibly increased. 
As previously acknowledged, the mortality rate also directly 
contributed to the unequal cell frequencies and, thus, may 
have created F-ratios which were not robust to violations of 
the normality and equal variance assumptions. The results of
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a potential violation of the homoscedasticity and normality 
assumptions previously have been discussed. Violation of the 
independence assumption may have produced F-ratios that were 
either very liberal, in the case of a positive correlation, 
or very conservative, in the case of a negative correlation.
In either event, the F-tests would not have been robust to a 
violation of this assumption. As a result, the alpha-set 
(.05) may not have been equivalent to alpha-true.
The second problem which may have impacted on the external 
validity of this study and which may affect all other forms of 
validity addressed was the issue raised by the research set­
ting that was selected. Because six rooms had to be secured 
within a close proximity to one another to complete the study, 
the data collection setting had to be moved from the most ideal 
setting (the building in which Communication classes were held) 
to a setting less ideal and less easily accessed by Ss (the 
campus library). Two specific sets of evidence support the 
salience of this problem to the degree of success in complet­
ing Phase II of this study. First, Ss themselves identified 
this problem as a major reason for non-participation during 
the course of the debriefing. Second, and perhaps as equally 
compelling, all Ss who initially were not assigned to dyads 
and who aided in assessing the reliability of the interpersonal 
uncertainty instrument arrived and participated in the comple­
tion of this individual task. The only difference between 
these Ss and Ss who were assigned to dyads was the location
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where the Ss were to meet. The former met in the building in 
which their Communication classes were held.
To this point, I have offered two possible interpreta­
tions of the results which emerged in this study. In addition, 
I have argued that the second interpretation (i.e., potential 
validity problems) is the most plausible at the present time, 
given the problems and events which surrounded the completion 
of Phase II. Although these problems indeed call into ques­
tion the overall validity of the study, the exploratory nature 
of the project as well as the patterns which emerged in the 
data suggested that interesting and pertinent information 
might be gleaned from additional analyses of the data, espe­
cially given the nature of Phase I in this study. For these 
reasons, the decision was made to include the following addi­
tional information, which is pertinent in addressing more 
completely Research Question Two.
Phase II: Contributions to Research Question Two
Although the study completed in Phase II did not allow 
for the testing of the proposed hypotheses, several interest­
ing results pertinent to Phase I did emerge. As stated ear­
lier, significant main effect differences were found in the
MANOVA due to conversational stage (F{6,76) = 9.03, p = .0001,
2
w = .077) . Additionally, MANOVA revealed that an effect for 
attitude similarity approached the level of significance 
(F(6,36) = 2.25, p = .06). As a result, univariate analyses 
of variance for each of the dependent variables were conducted
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in order to determine the existence of possible univariate ef­
fects. Again, results of this analysis revealed that conver­
sational stage produced a significant effect for both attrac­
tion and interpersonal uncertainty (attraction: F(2,40) =
2
5.14, p = .01, w = 0.06; interpersonal uncertainty: F(2,
2
40) = 32.66, p = .0001, w = 0.33). However, no significant 
effects were found for either dependent variable across level 
of attitude similarity (attraction: F (2,20) = 0.73, p = .49;
uncertainty: F(2,20) = 2.00, p = .16). Mean scores for un­
certainty were presented in Table 8 of the present chapter.
In turning to a possible interpretation of the additional 
analyses which were performed, several interesting patterns 
emerged —  again, keeping in mind the limitations previously 
presented. While shifts in the means for interpersonal uncer­
tainty were relatively large and were in the predicted direc­
tion as hypothesized in the uncertainty literature overall, 
shifts in attraction scores were very minute at best, usually 
ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 —  a fraction of a point. Although 
these findings potentially call into question previous re­
search concerning attitude similarity and attraction, again 
the limitations of the study do not allow this interpretation. 
Only additional research in this area would allow such an in­
terpretation. The limitations of Phase II seem to do far less 
damage, however, when addressing Research Question Two. The cell 
means seem generally to support the construct validity of the
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Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. In addition, they provide 
supporting evidence for the construct validity of the con­
versational stage manipulation.
Summary
In Chapter III of this thesis the results of Phase I and 
II were presented. In addition, each phase was discussed in 
light of possible interpretations. Phase I, which described 
the construction and validation of an interpersonal uncer­
tainty scale, was addressed in light of the existing liter­
ature concerning uncertainty. Phase II, which attempted to 
replicate previous findings, produced problems which forced 
an interpretation based on the questionable validity of the 
study. Although problems indeed existed for Phase II, they 
presented positive information concerning the potential con­
struct validity of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale. In 
addition, they offered useful insights for future research.
Given the findings and conclusions which emerged as a 
function of Phases I and II, individually, we now turn to 
overall conclusions which emerged concerning the project as 
a whole, as well as to possible directions for future re­




In previous chapters, a rationale and literature review 
were presented which argued the value and merits of conduct­
ing the present research. As a result of the arguments made, 
a set of methods and procedures were delineated which were 
designed to address the overall research question. Finally, 
the results which emerged in this study were reported and 
discussed in an effort to explicate and interpret the research 
findings.
In Chapter IV of this thesis, an overall assessment of 
the study will be made. More specifically, four major ques­
tions will be addressed. First, given the purposes of the 
study, to what degree can the goals of the project be said to 
have been achieved? Second, in what ways does the study con­
tribute to theory in the area of uncertainty as well as to 
theory concerning the attitude similarity-attraction relation­
ship? Related to this question, what practical contributions 
does the overall study make? Finally, this chapter will ad­
dress possible directions for future research concerning inter­
personal uncertainty as well as concerning the relationships 




As delineated in Chapter I, the purpose of the present 
research was twofold: (1) to construct and validate a mea­
sure of interpersonal uncertainty based on cumulative con­
ceptualizations of uncertainty in the literature, and (2) to
more clearly address the relationships among attitude similar­
ity, uncertainty and attraction. In order to assess the degree 
of success that was realized in achieving these goals, the 
following discussion presents an evaluation of each phase com­
prising the study. The discussion will begin with an assess­
ment of the degree to which Phase I achieved its primary goals. 
Following this evaluation, the discussion will turn to poten­
tial achievements which emerged from Phase II.
In beginning to evaluate the outcomes of Phase I and the
degree to which this stage achieved its purpose, the overall 
results suggest that Phase I successfully achieved its primary 
goal, i.e., a viable interpersonal uncertainty measure was 
constructed. As established in the previous chapter, the ten- 
item Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale possesses moderate to 
high internal reliability as well as a moderately high degree 
of face validity. Estimates of the face validity of the scale 
included communality estimates produced by the principle com­
ponents analysis and the provision of supporting evidence con­
cerning current literature in the area of uncertainty. Estim­
ates of the instrument's reliability took several forms. First, 
the factor loadings and the alpha coefficient provided evidence
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for the internal consistency of the scale. Second, analysis 
of variance, multiple classification analyses, and/or the 
calculation of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
revealed the potential generalizability of the Interpersonal 
Uncertainty Scale across the many demographic variables also 
employed in the study. Of particular interest were the poten­
tial differences which might exist across universities; no 
significant differences were found for this particular varia­
ble as well. Finally, the results of Phase II partially es­
tablished the viability of the uncertainty scale; when utilized, 
the instrument produced cell means which emerged in the appro­
priate directions.
In turning to an evaluation of the degree of success 
achieved by Phase II of the present study, perhaps the best 
assessment would be that the "jury is still out" —  we simply 
cannot know the value of the study until future research is 
conducted. As stated in the previous chapter, two interpre­
tations of the data exist. First, previous research by 
Sunnafrank and Miller (1981) and Sunnafrank (1983) in fact 
may be unreplicable, once corrections have been made for vio­
lations of statistical assumptions. However, the limitations 
of the present study itself prevent adequate testing of this 
hypothesis as well as suggest an alternative explanation: 
threats to the validity of the current research may have pro­
duced the discrepant results.
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Thus, given the limitations which were reflected in 
Chapter III, the question remains: What relationship, if
any, exists among attitude similarity, uncertainty and at­
traction? Although some light has been shed on possible rea­
sons for inconsistencies in past attitude similarity-attrac- 
tion research, particularly as a function of Chapters I and 
II of this study, little is known concerning the specific re­
lationships which might exist. However, some additional light 
has been shed on the problems which arise when one attempts 
to address the specific hypothesized relationships. In addi­
tion, the study revealed significant insights regarding direc­
tions for future research.
Theoretical Contributions
In addressing the theoretical contributions of each re­
spective stage of this study, again the outcome was favorable, 
particularly for Phase I. First, a viable operationalization 
of the uncertainty construct was achieved —  an operationaliza­
tion which provides an additional means of addressing inter­
personal uncertainty in initial interactions. (Again, the 
CLUES scales represent the only major alternative operationali­
zations, to date.) Because all theory building is based on a 
general ability of the researcher to tap the construct(s) of 
interest, creation of the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale in 
this study provides a potential foundation on which future 
uncertainty research and theory might be based.
1 1 2
Second, the findings which emerged in Phase I provide 
support for Berger's (1975) argument that prediction (proac­
tive attributional confidence) and explanation (retroactive 
attributional confidence) are inextricably bound. That items 
written for both dimensions of the construct loaded on the 
same initial principle component provides major supporting 
evidence for Berger's (1975) position. Ironically the find­
ings simultaneously call into question much of Berger's re­
search, however, given his almost exclusive reliance on 
Clatterbuck's CLUES scales. As stated earlier, Clatterbuck 
(1979) operationalized uncertainty through the use of two al­
ternative scales: the first, which was designed to tap pro­
active attributional confidence, and the second, which ad­
dressed the concept of retroactive attributional confidence. 
Additionally, Clatterbuck argued that the two instruments were 
interchangeable, given the degree to which the two measures 
were found to be correlated. The flaw in Clatterbuck's logic, 
however, is that if the two scales in fact are highly corre­
lated, they may be tapping a single, unidimensional uncertainty 
construct. Although Clatterbuck argues that the existence of 
strong correlations supports the interchangeability of the two 
uncertainty scales, an alternative argument may be made that 
sensitivity of the scale to measure what it is supposed to 
measure is the primary goal of the researcher whenever he or 
she utilizes an instrument or scale. In this instance, 
Clatterbuck may have traded the potential sensitivity of an
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alternative scale for the ease which accompanied continued use 
of his own pre-existing uncertainty measures. Perhaps, a more 
precise index of interpersonal uncertainty might have been an 
instrument which taps both elements of uncertainty within a 
single, multi-dimensional instrument. The ten-item Interper­
sonal Uncertainty Scale represents one such possible index.
A third theoretical contribution which Phase I makes to 
a clearer understanding of the uncertainty construct is that 
the findings call into question the alleged contribution of 
perceived "influence" or "control" to an explication of inter­
personal uncertainty (see Berger and Bradac, 1982) . Because 
approximately one-third of the items constructed in the pres­
ent study for the initial 65-item Interpersonal Uncertainty 
Scale addressed the concept of "influence," and because no 
"influence" items loaded purely on any principle component, a 
question is raised regarding the value of the concept's in­
clusion in the uncertainty literature. Two possible explana­
tions exist, however, for the "poor showing" of the influence 
dimension: (1) influence, in fact, may not affect interper­
sonal uncertainty in initial interactions or (2) the opera­
tional definition of the construct may have been inadequate, 
given that no items loaded on any resulting factor. Although 
the first explanation represents one viable interpretation of 
the results, the probability that all 17 "influence" items 
fell out of the analysis by chance alone seems exceptionally 
low, given the approximately equal loading on Factor 1 by
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items tapping "prediction" and "explanation." However, be­
cause this study represents at best an initial attempt to 
tap the hypothesized relationship between "influence" and 
interpersonal uncertainty in initial interactions, future 
research more completely should address the issues before 
definitive conclusions regarding the relationship may be 
drawn.
In turning to the theoretical contributions of Phase II 
and its implications for the uncertainty literature, perhaps 
the greatest contribution which emerges is the heightened 
sense of awareness that the study produced concerning in­
herent problems in attitude similarity-attraction research. 
Although no easily interpretable findings may be said to have 
resulted from Phase II, valuable insights were gained regard­
ing the need for researchers to more accurately report pro­
cedures that are utilized and limitations which emerge. Cer­
tainly, in recent years, the editorial policies of Communica­
tion journals seem to have changed, particularly regarding 
the length and form in which these research elements are pre­
sented. More specifically, a premium seemingly is placed 
on studies containing no visible limitations. Such a policy 
is reflected in the few articles which include precise de­
scriptions of research procedures as well as the few which 
precisely address the respective study's limitations. As a 
result of such policies, specific attempts on the part of 
this researcher to replicate one such study provide a key
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example of the problems which possibly may emerge. Thus, 
through accurate reporting of the problems which existed in 
the present research and through a careful delineation of the 
study's limitations, it was hoped that researchers might gain 
from both the content and the form in which the results and 
discussion of this study were presented. Given the nature of 
theory building as a scientific enterprise, such insights 
alone contribute to the overall theory building process.
A second theoretical contribution which the completion 
of Phase II offers is the establishment of a need for greater 
caution when conducting dyadic research. As reflected 
throughout this dissertation, the use of dyadic data neces­
sarily complicates any research endeavor, particularly the 
procedural and statistical decisions which must be made. As 
a result, special care must be taken to test for potential 
violations of assumptions as well as to use the appropriate 
statistical procedures. The limitations of this study alone 
reflect the scope of these concerns, as does the rationale 
and literature review on which this study was based.
Finally, although we know little more about either the 
attitude similarity-attraction relationship or the potential 
mediating effects of uncertainty. Phase II may have shed some 
light on particular reasons for inconsistencies in the liter­
ature. First, violations of assumptions will produce often 
uninterpretable results. As a result, if such violations are 
overlooked, one's findings may seem inconsistent rather than
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difficult to interpret. Second, internal validity problems 
within a given study may contribute to the perception that 
inconsistencies exist, particularly as a function of such 
threats as high mortality rates, testing effects or selection 
effects. The precise outcomes of these effects were described 
in Chapter III. Third, an inability on the part of researchers 
to successfully manipulate their independent variables has 
posed particular threats to research in the areas of attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction (e.g., Berger and 
Clatterbuck, 1976, and the present study). As a result of 
this problem, the construct validity of those studies may be 
called into question and, again conflicting results may emerge 
in the process. Finally, threats to the external validity of 
a study can directly affect one's results, in many ways which 
often make one's data uninterpretable. As argued in Chapter 
III, persons, settings, and times employed in a given research 
project directly impact on one's results. In short, each form 
of validity discussed and its respective degrees of achieve­
ment have the potential to directly affect one's results and 
subsequent interpretations. Consequently, the potential and 
actual existence of such threats across the attitude similar- 
ity-uncertainty-attraction literature helps partially to ex­
plain inconsistent and contradictory findings.
Practical Contributions 
In attempting to establish the practical significance of 
each phase completed in this study, again, the discussion may
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be broken into two separate parts: (1) contributions made
by Phase I regarding the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale and 
(2) contributions potentially offered as a function of Phase 
II, which addressed the attitude similarity-uncertainty-at- 
traction relationship. Each of these potential contributions 
will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
Perhaps, the single-most practical contribution of this 
study was the creation of the ten-item Interpersonal Uncertainty 
Scale. As stated earlier, this index is moderate to high in 
internal consistency, evidenced by the factor loadings, as well 
as the reliability of the scale across the three different sec­
tions of the country, to date (the South, the Southwest and the 
Midwest respectively; see Chapter III, page 74). In addition, 
the communality estimates indicate a moderate degree of vali­
dity for the factor structure, and the direction of the cell 
means for uncertainty assessed in Phase II were found to exist 
in the hypothesized direction. The latter provides initial 
supporting evidence for the construct validity of of the scale.
In terms of the practical contribution of the scale it­
self, little information is available, given the recency of 
its construction and initial validation. In addition, prob­
lems existed in Phase II of the study, by which the value of 
the scale was to have been assessed. Until future research 
has been conducted and the scale has been thoroughly tested, 
little information will exist concerning its practical signi­
ficance .
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In turning to the practical contributions of Phase II, 
perhaps the greatest value of this stage lies in its direc­
tions for future research. Because the completion of Phase 
II was problematic in several areas concerning the study's 
overall validity, many insights were revealed as a function 
of its limitations. However, given that these "insights" 
have been reviewed at several points, again the question turns 
to the overall practical contributions of the study. In an­
swering this question, the same response as that concerning 
Phase I must be given: namely, that much more research re­
mains to be conducted before assessments of the study's prac­
tical value will be known.
Having acknowledged this additional limitation of the 
study, the discussion now turns to potential directions for 
future research. Again, the presentation will focus on fu­
ture directions for research concerning both uncertainty and 
the relationships among attitude similarity, uncertainty and 
attraction.
Directions for Future Research
In turning to directions for future research which emerged 
from the present study, potential directions evolved for (1) 
uncertainty research overall, (2) for scholars who are inter­
ested in the relationships among attitude similarity, uncer­
tainty and attraction, and (3) for this researcher regarding 
her own specific research program. Given the value of these 
directions for researchers which emerged as a function of the
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study, the decision was made to report each set of possible 
options at the present time. The discussion begins with an 
address of directions for future research in the area of un­
certainty.
Future Research in the 
Area of Uncertainty 
In turning to directions for future research concerning 
"uncertainty" which evolved from the present study, two major 
goals emerged as targets for researchers in the area. First, 
measures of uncertainty should continue to be developed and to be 
stringently evaluated at every level with regard to reliabil­
ity and validity. Such assessments will allow for more ac­
curate measurements of the uncertainty construct. In addi­
tion, once one (or more) valid and reliable indexes have been 
constructed and thoroughly tested, attempts should be made to 
construct ways of manipulating uncertainty.
In turning to the first of these directions for uncer­
tainty research, perhaps the most compelling argument that 
may be made for the direction's value is that we cannot begin 
to understand interpersonal uncertainty until we can develop 
reliable and valid indicators of the underlying construct.
In short, until researchers are able to successfully "measure" 
varying levels of interpersonal uncertainty, little informa­
tion will be gleaned regarding the value of the uncertainty 
construct or its potential relationship to other variables such 
as attitude similarity and attraction.
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Second, researchers must begin to find ways of manipulat­
ing the uncertainty variable, particularly once one or more 
valid and reliable indexes have been achieved. Such an abil­
ity is critical if researchers are to begin addressing the 
causal relationships which potentially exist between uncer­
tainty and other variables of interest. Once the creation 
and validation of uncertainty measures have been achieved, 
in turn the measures of uncertainty themselves may act as man­
ipulation checks. In this way the construct validity of the 
interpersonal uncertainty measure also may be assessed.
Future Research Concerning Attitude 
Similarity and Attraction
In addressing future directions for researchers who are 
interested in the relationships among attitude similarity, un­
certainty and attraction, the task becomes increasingly ardu­
ous given the state of the literature concerning these varia­
bles. For example, before we can actually begin to address 
the hypothesized relationships among the variables, we must 
begin to sort out potential problems in previous research and 
to find ways of addressing potential inconsistencies before 
further work continues. Chapter I of this dissertation repre­
sents one such attempt to critically analyze previous research.
Related to this first suggestion, uncertainty scholars 
should become increasingly strenuous in assessing the merits 
of their own research, as well as the work of other researchers 
in pertinent or related areas of interest. As argued throughout
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this thesis, much research has "slipped past" editors' and 
reviewers' hands with regard to methodological and statisti­
cal weaknesses. As a result, the literature is replete with 
inconsistent and contradictory findings.
Third, key studies should be replicated in instances 
where weaknesses in the research have become known. The at­
tempted replication in the present study represents such an 
instance, in this case an important replication given the 
methodological and statistical weaknesses in the Sunnafrank 
(1983) study. Although, for some years, replications have 
been frowned upon as the "black sheep" of research endeavors, 
the very nature of the scientific enterprise actually requires 
the constant questioning of results. Applied to research con­
cerning attitude similarity and attraction, replications of 
key studies which are questionable in nature may provide a 
more solid foundation from which to build au understanding of 
the relationships among attitude similarity, uncertainty and 
attraction. Unless such a foundation is built, current theor­
ies may begin to crumble.
Fourth, once such attempts are made to clarify potential 
inconsistencies existing in the uncertainty literature, both 
through critical assessments of research and possibly a number 
of replications, attempts should be made to manipulate success­
fully both "attitude similarity" and "uncertainty." Until 
these variables can be successfully manipulated, we cannot 
establish the existence of causal structures among attitude 
similarity, uncertainty and attraction.
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Directions for a Specific Research Program in 
the Area of Attitude Similarity,
Uncertainty, and Attraction 
In turning to directions for a specific research program 
which emerge from the present research, perhaps the most im­
mediate concern is the need to replicate Phase II, with cor­
rections for each threat to validity established and delin­
eated in Chapter III. Such a study would take into account 
the need for a much larger population from which Ss could be 
drawn as well as the need to more cautiously utilize randomi­
zation procedures and equal cell sizes. Second, this replica­
tion would attempt to more successfully manipulate the "atti­
tude similarity" variable and would take into account the 
testing effect which potentially effected previous results. 
Finally, a more appropriate setting and time would be chosen 
for experimental sessions to maximize subjects' participation. 
In short, replication of the present study is of greatest con­
cern .
Given the potential existence of supporting evidence 
which might emerge from such a replication of the current 
study, the next step would be the calculation of Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients between uncertainty 
and attraction at each level of the attitude similarity X 
conversational stage analysis. Results of such an analysis 
would produce additional insights concerning the relationships 
among uncertainty and attraction as a function of level of
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attitude similarity and would lend credence to the construct 
validity of the Interpersonal Uncertainty scale.
Simultaneously, efforts could be made to take the Inter­
personal Uncertainty Scale into additional research settings, 
in an attempt to assess the reliability of the uncertainty 
scale in non-laboratory settings. Likewise, assessments of 
validity might be made as a function of the degree to which 
the scale functioned successfully in each successive study 
completed. In either event, constant attempts should be made 
to establish the degree of validity and reliability of the 
uncertainty scale. In this way, more information might be 
gleaned concerning the uncertainty construct.
Given the possibility that a valid and reliable index of 
uncertainty might emerge from this hypothetical research, the 
next step would be an attempt to manipulate uncertainty, per­
haps using the Interpersonal Uncertainty Scale as a manipula­
tion check. Should the successful manipulation of both atti­
tude similarity and uncertainty evolve in a given study, head­
way could be made in establishing the potential mediating ef­
fects of uncertainty in the attitude similarity-attraction 
relationship.
Summary
In summary, the purpose of this dissertation was two-fold: 
to construct and validate a measure of interpersonal uncertainty 
based on cumulative conceptualizations in the literature, and 
to test for the existence of possible relationships among
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attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction. Following 
the completion of a two-phase study, which was designed to 
address each of these goals, results concerning the succes­
sive stages of the research project were presented and in­
terpreted. It was determined that Phase I achieved a highly 
positive degree of success, while Phase II was limited in the 
degree to which its immediate goals were achieved. Based on 
these perceptions. Chapter IV presented an overall evaluation 
of the study. In addition, directions for future research in 
the areas of attitude similarity, uncertainty and attraction 
were presented.
FOOTNOTES
^Specific details concerning the pairwise comparisons 
were not reported. The author stated only that a difference 
existed between the 0% and 100% conditions (p < .05), and that 
the differences between the 50% and 100% conditions fell just 
short of significance. (Berger and Clatterbuck, 1976)
2Although Berger et al (1976) made statements concerning 
directionality with regard to the hypothesized relationships 
between attraction and reciprocity of conversational exchange 
as well as for differences in predictive confidence as a func­
tion of sex, only results of their F-tests were presented as 
evidence. No tests of selected comparisons, the primary means 
of establishing directionality, were reported. Consequently, 
the authors' interpretation of the data is questionable.
^These results will be reviewed at a later point in time 
and, therefore, will not be presented here.
^Because the results concerning this hypothesis are not 
directly related to the research question, they will not be 
reviewed. For a more complete discussion, the reader is di­
rected to Clatterbuck (1979) .
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^For example, Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman and Miller 
(1976) found that females reported higher confidence in predic­
tive abilities than males while other researchers have found 
no significant gender effects.
^Due to scheduling problems and the distribution of at­
titude responses, at times it became necessary for the exper­
imenter to arbitrarily pair the dyads.
^Compound symmetry is a special case of the sphericity 
assumption and requires equality of correlations between ob­
servations in all possible fixed effects levels across all 
levels of the random variable.
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The study in which you are about to participate focuses on 
how we form impressions of other people and how that process 
affects our thoughts and feelings about future relationships 
with those individuals. In order to help us understand this 
process, we will be asking you to complete an information 
sheet and a brief attitude questionnaire. We then will pro­
vide you with the same questionnaire, as it was completed by 
a student at another major university, and will ask you to 
form an impression of that person based on his or her re­
sponses. Once you have read his or her responses and have 
thought about what that person is like, we will ask you to 
complete another attitude survey and a questionnaire with 
that person in mind. We hope that you enjoy participating 
in this study and that you find it to be an interesting ex­
perience. Thank you, in advance, for your participation.
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INFORMATION SHEET: Please fill in the following information
about yourself.
1. Social Security Number: _____
2. Age: ____________________
3. Sex (circle one): Male
4. Ethnic background (circle one)
Female
Caucasian, not Hispanic 
Black, not Hispanic 
Hispanic
Asian or Pacific Islander 






Hometown and State: 
University: _______








*Note: We are asking for your social security number in
order that we may complete additional research in 
the future without confusion. Any responses that 
you make in this questionnaire will remain confi­
dential .
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 1: Each of us has our own unique attitudes 
and opinions concerning current issues. 
On the following scale, please indicate 
whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements.
Agree Disagree
Nuclear power should not be 
maintained as a major source 
of energy in the United States.
Women should have the right 
to choose abortion as an al­




The Attitude Similarity/Dissimilarity Manipulation
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 2: Like the scale that you just completed, 
the following questionnaire was completed 
by a student at another major university. 
After reading his or her answers which 
are presented below, take a few moments 
and form an impression of the type of 
person that you think he or she is, based 
on his or her responses. Also think 
about the extent to which that person's 
attitudes overall may agree or disagree 
with yours.
Agree Disagree
Nuclear power should not be 
maintained as a major source 
of energy in the United States, X
Women should have the right 
to choose abortion as an al­
ternative method of birth 
control. X
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 2; Like the scale that you just completed, 
the following questionnaire was completed 
by a student at another major university. 
After reading his or her answers which 
are presented below, take a few moments 
and form an impression of the type of 
person that you think he or she is, based 
on his or her responses. Also think 
about the extent to which that person's 
attitudes overall may agree or disagree 
with yours.
Agree Disagree
1. Nuclear power should not be 
maintained as a major source 
of energy in the United States, X
2. Women should have the right 
to choose abortion as an al­
ternative method of birth 
control. X
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 2 i Like the scale that you just completed, 
the following questionnaire was completed 
by a student at another major university. 
After reading his or her answers which 
are presented below, take a few moments 
and form an impression of the type of 
person that you think he or she is, based 
on his or her responses. Also think 
about the extent to which that person's 
attitudes overall may agree or disagree 
with yours.
Agree Disagree
1. Nuclear power should not be 
maintained as a major source 
of energy in the United States, X
2. Women should have the right 
to choose abortion as an al­
ternative method of birth 
control. X
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 2: Like the scale that you just completed,
the following questionnaire was completed 
by a student at another major university. 
After reading his or her answers which 
are presented below, take a few moments 
and form an impression of the type of 
person that you think he or she is, based 
on his or her responses. Also think 
about the extent to which that person's 
attitudes overall may agree or disagree 
with yours.
Agree Disagree
Nuclear power should not be
maintained as a major source w
of energy in the United States. _____
2. Women should have the right 
to choose abortion as an al­
ternative method of birth
control.   A
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ATTITUDE SURVEY 3: Based on the impression that you have
just formed of the person whose attitude 
survey you have read, to what degree do 
you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?
1. Generally, I believe that this 
person and I have similar atti­
tudes .
2. This person and I are dissimilar 
in beliefs.
3. Overall, this person and I are 
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully the following statements
which are designed to tap your thoughts and feelings about 
other people. Then, specifically keeping in mind the person 
that you just formed an impression about, circle the number 
(ranging from very strongly agree to very strongly disagree) 
which best represents the degree to which you agree or dis­
agree with each of the statements. Think carefully about 





1. Generally, I feel uncertain that I 
could predict the personal values 
that _____  holds.
2. In general, I feel confident that 
I could have an impact on 's 
personal values.
3. In general, I feel confident that 
I could influence the rewards that 
would exist in a relationship with
4. Generally, I feel sure that I could 
predict the risks involved in a re­
lationship with ______.
5. I feel unsure of my ability to ex­
plain how _____  would respond in
most formal settings.
6. In most formal settings, I feel
sure that I could predict how _____
would respond.
7. I feel certain that I could accu­
rately predict what would 
want to achieve if she/he spoke 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 78. In most situations, I feel unsure 
that I could explain 's re­
sponses toward me.
9. I am doubtful of my general 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
ability to predict how _____
would behave.
10. I feel that I know ______ well. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. In general, I feel certain that 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
I could influence 's personal
attitudes.
12. Generally, I feel certain about 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
predicting 's personal prefer­
ences .
13. I feel uncertain that I could 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
predict how _____  would respond
to me in most situations.
14. In general, I would feel unable 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
to explain the potential status
of a relationship with ______.
15. I feel that I could accurately 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
predict 's personal attitudes.
16. I would feel uncertain about 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
predicting 's feelings and
emotions.
17. In general, I am unsure that I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
could explain 's behavior.
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18. Generally, I am confident that I 
could explain what I would say 
to ______.
19. I could empathize with (share) 
the way _____  feels about him­
self/herself .
20. I feel sure that I could predict
the common goals that ______ and
I would have in a personal rela­
tionship.
21. In general, I feel uncertain 
that I could explain common 
goals for our relationship.
22. In most instances, I feel confi­
dent that I could influence the 
costs that would arise in a re­
lationship with ______.
23. I am doubtful that I could 
choose the best way to talk 
with ______ in most situations.
24. I feel uncertain about predict­
ing how _____  would respond in
most informal settings.
25. In most instances, I feel doubt­
ful that I could explain 's 
personal values.
26. I feel doubtful that I could pre­
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27. In most cases, I feel certain that 
I could explain 's personal at­
titudes .
28. In most instances,I would feel un­
sure of my ability to explain our 
responses to one another.
29. In general, I am confident that I 
could predict the costs involved 
in a relationship with ______.
30. Generally, I am sure that I could
influence what _____  would want to
achieve when speaking with me.
31. I feel doubtful that I could ex­
plain the conflict that would 
exist in our relationship.
32. I would feel uncertain of my abil­
ity to influence 's personal 
goals.
33. Generally, I am sure that I could
influence what _____  would say to
m e .
34. I feel certain that I could under­
stand the way that ______  feels
about himself/herself.
35. In general, I feel confident that 
I could control the risks involved 
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36. Generally, I feel unsure that I 
could predict what I would want 
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37. In most instances, I feel confident 1 
that I could predict future con­
flicts in our relationship.
I feel sure of my ability to man- 1 2  3
age conflict in a potential rela­
tionship with _____ .
39. I feel doubtful that I could pre­
dict rewards that would come from 
a personal relationship with _____
40. Generally, I am uncertain that I 
can predict how _____  would evalu­
ate me in most situations.
41. In general, I would feel confident 
of achieving my goals in a personal 
relationship with ______.
42. Generally, I am sure that I could 
explain ’s personal beliefs.
43. In most instances, I feel doubtful 
that I could influence the goals 
of a personal relationship with
44. Generally, I feel confident that
I could explain why _____  would
say to me the things that s/he 
would say.
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45. In general, I feel doubtful that 
I could influence the decisions 
that ______ makes.
46. I am doubtful of my ability to 
influence 's personal beliefs.
47. I feel uncertain that I could ex­
plain 's responses in most in­
formal settings.
48. In general, I feel confident that 
I could explain the rewards that 
would exist in our relationship.
49. I feel sure that I could explain 
 ^  personal preferences.
50. I feel doubtful that I could in­
fluence the status of a relation­
ship with _____ .
51. I feel certain that _____  would
like me.
52. In general, I am doubtful that I 
could affect 's personal prefer­
ences .
53. In most cases, I would feel unsure 
about predicting how we would re­
spond to one another.
54. Generally, I feel certain that I 
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55. I feel confident that I could pre­
dict how I would respond to _____ .
56. In general, I feel uncertain that 
I could predict * s personal be­
liefs .
57. I am uncertain that _____  could
choose the best way to talk with 
me in most situations.
58. I feel doubtful that I could ex­
plain 's evaluations of me.
59. In general, I feel sure that I
could explain the costs that 
would exist in a personal rela­
tionship with ______.
60. Generally, I feel unsure that I 
could influence the way that 
_____  behaves.
61. I feel doubtful that I could in­
fluence how   would evaluate
m e .
62. In most instances, I feel certain
that I could explain the risks 
involved in a personal relation­
ship with ______.
63. I would feel confident about
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64. I feel confident that I could ex­
plain my responses to ______.
65. Generally, I am uncertain about
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1. I am doubtful of my general ability
to predict how _____  would behave.
2. I feel sure that I could predict the
common goals that ______ and I would
have in a personal relationship.
3. I feel uncertain about predicting 1 2  3 4 5 6
how _____  would respond in most in­
formal settings.
4. In most instances, I feel doubtful 1 2  3 4 5 6
that I could explain 's personal
values.
5. In most cases, I feel certain that 1 2  3 4 5 6
I could explain 's personal at­
titudes .
6. In general, I am confident that I 1 2  3 4 5 6
could predict the costs involved
in a relationship with ______.
7. Generally, I feel confident that I 1 2  3 4 5 6
could explain w h y ______ would say
to me the things that s/he would say.
8. In general, I feel confident that 1 2  3 4 5 6
I could explain the rewards that
would exist in our relationship.
9. I feel sure that I could explain 1 2  3 4 5 6
's personal preferences.
10. In general, I feel sure that I 1 2  3 4 5 6
could explain the costs that 
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The Interpersonal Judgment Scale
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QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER THREE: For each of the following ques­
tions, please place an "X" in the blank beside the sentence 
which best represents your thoughts and feelings about the 
person with whom you have just shared your ideas concerning 
the attitude items.
Intelligence (check one):
I believe that this 
in intelligence.
I believe that this 
telligence.
I believe that this 
in intelligence.
I believe that this 
I believe that this 
in intelligence.
I believe that this 
telligence.









very much above average
above average in in-
slightly above average
average in intelligence, 
slightly below average
below average in in-
very much below average
Morality (check one):
This person impresses me as being
This person impresses me as being
This person impresses me as being
degree.
This person impresses me as being 
moral nor particularly immoral. 
This person impresses me as being 
degree.
This person impresses me as being
This person impresses me as being
extremely moral. 
moral.
moral to a slight 
neither particularly 
immoral to a slight 
immoral.
extremely immoral.
Working Together in this Experiment (check one):
  I believe that I very much dislike working with this
person in this experiment.
  I believe that I dislike working with this person in
this experiment.
  I believe that I dislike working with this person in
this experiment to a slight degree.
  I believe that I neither particularly dislike nor par­
ticularly enjoy working with this person in this ex­
periment.
  I believe that I enjoy working with this person in
this experiment to a slight degree.
  I believe that I enjoy working with this person in
this experiment.
  I believe that I very much enjoy working with this per­
son in this experiment.
162
Adjustment (check one);
  I believe that this person is extremely maladjusted.
  I believe that this person is maladjusted.
  I believe that this person is maladjusted to a slight
degree.
  I believe that this person is neither particularly
maladjusted nor particularly well adjusted.
  I believe that this person is well adjusted to a
slight degree.
  I believe that this person is well adjusted.
  I believe that this person is extremely well adjusted,
Personal Feelings (check one);
  I feel that I like this person very much.
  I feel that I like this person.
  I feel that I like this person to a slight degree.
  I feel that I neither particularly like nor particu­
larly dislike this person.
  I feel that I dislike this person to a slight degree,
  I feel that I dislike this person.
  I feel that I dislike this person very much.
Knowledge of Current Events (check one):
  I believe that this person is very much below average
in his (her) knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is below average in his
(her) knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is slightly below average
in his (her) knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is average in his (her)
knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is slightly above average
in his (her) knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is above average in his
(her) knowledge of current events.
  I believe that this person is very much above average























1 2  3 4 5 6 7
FACTORS
10 11 12
*Exact Eigenvalues are reported in Table 4 on page 55
TABLE 2
ITEMS NOT LOADING ON FACTOR 1 OF THE INTERPERSONAL UNCERTAINTY SCALE-65
Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO FU F12 «2
1. Generally, 1 feel uncertain that 1 
could predict the personal values that 
holds. .33 -.28 .22 .03 -.09 .27 -.19 -.04 -.17 .12 -.06 -.24 .46
2. In general, I feel confident that 1 
could have an Impact on 'a 
personal values. .34 .36 -.08 .34 -.11 .26 .20 -.11 .16 .37 .08 .08 .69
3. In general, I feel confident that 1 
could influence the rewards that would 
exist In a relationship with .43 .32 -.03 .28 .08 .14 .07 .16 .09 .29 -.10 .22 .57
4. Generally, I feel sure that I could 
predict the risks Involved In a rela­
tionship with .44 -.27 -.24 -.07 -.21 .14 .01 -.04 .03 -.000 -.10 .15 .43
5. I feel unsure of my ability to explain 
how would respond In most 
formal settings. .51 -.28 .14 .16 .08 -.01 .22 .000 -.41 .18 .05 -.20 .68
6. In most formal settings, I feel sure 
that I could predict how would 
respond. .36 -.29 -.12 .21 .07 .06 .26 .04 -.28 .09 .11 -.21 .68
7. 1 feel certain that 1 could accurately 
predict what would want to 
achieve If she/he spoke with me. .48 -.26 -.11 .13 .07 .27 .19 .16 -.06 -.16 .04 .11 .51
8. In most situations, I feel unsure that 
1 could explain 's responses to me. .39 -.16 .33 -.10 .01 .21 -.01 .20 -.34 .002 -.07 .26 .57
10. I feel that 1 know well. .40 -.32 -.27 .30 .09 -.01 .15 -.10 .03 .19 .11 -.11 .53
11. In general, I feel certain that I could 
Influence 's personal attitudes. .51 .31 -.13 .30 -.19 .27 .07 -.009 .12 .14 .05 .05 .62
Ui
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll FI2 1)2
12. Generally, I feel certain about pre­
dicting 's personal preferences. .57 -.32 -.20 .15 .08 .01 .11 .004 .04 -.003 .04 .03 .51
13. I feel uncertain that I could predict 
how would respond to me in most 
situations. .39 -.18 .25 .21 -.03 .26 -.10 .12 -.09 .007 -.10 .13 .42
14. In general, I would feel unable to 
explain the potential status of a rela­
tionship with .43 -.34 .25 .06 -.03 .03 -.29 .08 .03 .16 -.25 .14 .56
15. I feel that I could accurately predict 
's personal attitudes. .60 .41 -.15 .14 -.02 .09 -.02 .05 .06 -.02 -.09 -.13 .61
16. I would feel uncertain about predicting 
'a feeilngs and emotions. .52 -.35 .11 .22 .03 .03 -.23 .10 .09 -.04 .08 .07 .54
17. In general, I am unsure that I could 
explain 's behavior. .43 -.31 .17 .09 .08 -.002 -.15 .009 .03 -.03 -.10 .14 .37
18. Generally, I am confident that I could 
explain what I would say to . .46 .20 -.04 -.33 .08 .32 .07 .15 .21 -.04 .01 -.02 .55
19. I could empathize with (share) the way 
feels about himself/herself. .37 .23 -.09 -.08 .44 .24 -.12 .14 .15 .16 -.15 -.14 .57
21. In general, I feel uncertain that I 
could explain common goals for our rela­
tionship. .49 .03 .05 .09 .22 -.27 .03 .24 .02 -.31 -.20 -.07 .57
22. In most instances, I feel confident that 
I could influence the costs that would 





Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll F12
23. I am doubtful that 1 could choose the 
best way to talk with in most 
situations. .42 .26 .22 -.19 .17 .08 -.02 .32 .06 .04 .01 -.27 .54
26. 1 feel doubtful that 1 could predict 
the future status of a relationship with
.54 -.27 -.03 -.01 -.09 -.30 .01 .06 .29 .16 -.24 -.08 .64
28. In most instances, I would feel unsure 
of my ability to explain our responses 
to one another. .47 .11 .24 -.35 .09 .06 .22 -.05 .19 -.006 -.13 -.15 .56
30. Generally, I am sure that I could 
influence what would want to 
achieve when speaking with me. .55 .21 -.26 .11 -.06 .16 .15 .09 .06 -.17 -.01 .13 .54
31. I feel doubtful that I could explain 
the conflict that would exist in our 
relationship. .44 —.06 .09 -.40 -.22 .04 .04 .29 —.06 -.006 .03 -.14 .52
32. I would feel uncertain of sy ability to 
influence 's personal goals. .52 .31 .11 .08 -.19 .04 .06 .09 .17 -.05 .03 -.12 .48
33. Generally, I am sure that 1 could 
influence what would say to me. .47 .24 -.17 .18 -.13 .08 .04 -.11 -.05 -.28 -.05 .18 .49
34. 1 feel certain that 1 could understand 
the way that feels about him­
self/herself . .45 .06 -.17 -.21 .27 .22 -.31 .03 .12 -.13 .24 -.10 .59
35. In general, 1 feel confident that 1 
could control the risks involved in a 
personal relationship with .52 .22 -.26 -.04 .18 -.04 -.14 -.07 -.17 -.001 -.08 -.002 .48
ON
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll F12 l|Z
36. Generally, I feel unsure that I could 
predict what I would want to achieve 
when speaking with .41 .17 .29 -.40 -.05 .03 .20 .08 -.13 -.05 .10 .05 .52
37. In most instances, I feel confident 
that I could predict future conflicts 
in our relationship. .52 -.21 -.29 -.27 -.35 -.03 .04 .04 -.16 -.06 .07 .07 .64
38. I feel sure of my ability to manage 
conflict in a potential relationship 
with .50 .36 -.11 -.15 .15 -.12 -.10 .02 -.19 .09 .12 -.09 .52
39. I feel doubtful that I could predict 
rewards that would come from a personal 
relationship with .47 .18 .08 -.07 .002 -.31 .16 .24 -.03 .16 .11 .06 .48
40. Generally, I am uncertain that I can 
predict how would evaluate me 
in most situations. .54 -.26 .27 -.11 -.06 -.05 .22 -.09 .14 -.04 .006 .22 .58
41. In general, 1 would feel confident of 
achieving ray goals in a personal rela­
tionship with .54 .34 -.13 .02 .33 -.14 -.13 .003 -.08 .10 -.09 .08 .60
42. Generally, I am sure that I could 
explain 's personal beliefs. .56 -.22 -.22 -.07 .18 .13 -.10 -.17 -.03 -.17 .28 -.03 .62
43. In most instances, I feel doubtful 
that I could influence the goals of a 
personal relationship with .53 .42 .17 .10 -.11 -.17 .03 .09 -.02 -.11 .02 .07 .56
45. In general, I feel doubtful that I 
could Influence the decisions that 
makes. .48 .46 .22 .22 -.20 .06 -.04 -.009 .02 -.10 .16 -.04 .62
00
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll F12 1.2
46. I am doubtful of my ability to Influence 
's personal beliefs. .47 .44 .13 .19 -.27 .05 .02 -.04 -.02 -.19 .09 -.20 .63
47. I feel uncertain that 1 could explain 
's responses in most Informal 
settings. .51 .005 .16 .009 .000 -.20 .25 -.18 -.11 -.04 -.06 -.06 .44
50. 1 feel doubtful that 1 could Influence 
the status of a relationship with
.54 .30 .20 .03 -.10 -.14 -.20 .05 -.15 .08 -.003 -.05 .53
51. 1 feel certain that would 
like me. .43 .32 -.08 .21 .35 -.17 -.001 -.16 -.15 .07 —.06 .06 .54
52. In general, 1 am doubtful that I could 
affect 's personal preferences. .52 .41 .11 .32 -.16 -.04 -.17 -.13 -.01 -.05 .13 -.05 .64
53. In most cases, I would feel unsure about 
predicting how we would respond to one 
another. .54 -.17 .30 -.02 .13 -.12 -.13 -.10 .09 .09 -.001 .15 .51
54. Generally, 1 feel certain that I could 
affect how would respond to me. .49 .20 -.05 -.05 .008 .12 -.07 -.26 -.26 -.11 -.25 .02 .52
55. I feel confident that I could predict 
how 1 would respond to .56 -.07 -.03 -.28 .04 .06 .12 -.09 -.04 -.002 .007 .16 .45
56. In general, I feel uncertain that 1 
could predict 's personal beliefs. .54 -.17 .19 .05 -.07 -.002 -.24 -.32 .15 -.12 .01 -.07 .56
57. I am uncertain that could 
choose the best way to talk with me in 
most situations. .26 -.06 .37 .13 .21 -.16 .10 .03 .26 -.12 .39 .20 .58
58. 1 feel doubtful that 1 could explain 




Items FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FIO Fll FI2
60. Generally, I feel unsure that I could
influence the way that behaves. .52 .14 .26 .21 -.18 -.06 -.02 -.18 .03 -.04 -.13 -.19 .52
61. I feel doubtful that I could Influence 
how would evaluate me. .53 .17 .25 -.10 -.07 .03 -.04 -.18 -.04 -.07 -.35 -.002 .55
62. In most Instances, I feel certain that 
I could explain the risks involved in 
a personal relationship with .57 -.04 -.23 -.23 -.29 -.08 -.31 .04 .06 .21 .10 -.03 .68
63. I would feel confident about what to 
say to in most situations. .57 .21 -.007 -.20 ,18 .03 .04 -.25 .02 .14 .08 -.02 .54
64. I feel confident that I could explain 
my responses to . .46 .24 -.05 -.41 .06 .17 .22 -.23 .16 .02 -.18 -.05 .64
65. Generally, I am uncertain about what
would say to me in most conver­
sations. .52 -.23 .14 -.06 .10 -.13 .22 -.13 .11 .14 .01 -.03 .46
Eigenvalues 16.94 4.19 2.51 2.36 1.8 1.49 1.32 1.30 1.22 1.15 1.12 1.05
% of Variance 26.1 6.4 3.9 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
Cum X of Variance 26.1 32.5 36.4 40.0 42.8 45.1 47.1 49.1 51.0 52.8 54.5 56.1
O
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Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Perceived Similarity, 
Interpersonal Uncertainty and Attraction*
Effect Degrees of Freedom F-Value Probability > F
Similarity (6,36) 2.25 .06
Sex (3,18) 0.17 .91
Similarity x Sex (6,36) 0.14 .99
Conversational Stage (6,76) 9.03 .0001
Similarity x 
Conversational Stage (12,100) 0.87 .58
Sex X
Conversational Stage (6,76) 0.29 .94
Similarity x Sex x 
Conversational Stage (12,100) 1.29 .24
to
*The criterion used in this analysis was Milk's criterion.
APPENDIX I
Analysis of Variance Results
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TABLE 1
Univariate Analysis of Variance for Interpersonal Uncertainty
Source Df Sums of Squares F-Value Probability > F
Similarity 2 957.52099685 2.CO .16
Sex 1 8.96047419 0.04 .85
Similarity x Sex 2 77.44807298 0.16 .85
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (between)] 20 4786.62777778
Conversational Stage 2 1937.00692168 32.66 .0001
Similarity x 
Conversational Stage 4 24.24510045 0.20 .93
Sex X
Conversational Stage 2 15.94134791 0.27 .77
Sex X Similarity x 
Conversational Stage 4 105.73587536 0.89 .48
Conversational Stage x 
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (within)] 40 1186.02222222
Note: R = .884 for overall model,
TABLE 2
Univariate Analysis of Variance for Interpersonal Attraction
Source Df Sums of Squares F-Value Probability > F
Similarity 2 16.41168458 0.73 .49
Sex 1 1.69638432 0.15 .70
Similarity x Sex 2 3.80356704 0.17 .85
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (between)] 20 224.95555556
Conversational Stage 2 17.65418944 5.14 .01
Similarity x 
Conversational Stage 4 4.65924559 0.63 .61
Sex X
Conversational Stage 2 1.19699454 0.35 .71
Sex X  Similarity x 
Conversational Stage 4 14.52804428 2.12 .10
Conversational Stage x 
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (within)] 40 68.67777778
Note: R = .816 for overall model.
TABLE 3
Univariate Analysis of Variance for Perceived Attitude 
Similarity —  Manipulation Check
Source Df Sums of Squares F-Value Probability > F
Similarity 2 347.06236592 4.86 .02
Sex 1 0.55652390 0.02 .90
Similarity x Sex 2 10.12747027 0.14 .87
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (between)] 20 714.45555556
Conversational Stage 2 121.58551913 10.67 .0002
Similarity x 
Conver,3ational Stage 4 37.19175892 1.63 .19
Sex X
Conversational Stage 2 0.38697632 0.03 .97
Sex X Similarity x 
Conversational Stage 4 6.58495285 0.29 .88
Conversational Stage x 
Dyad (Similarity x Sex) 
[Error (within)] 40 227.81111111
Note: R = .855 for overall model,
